INAUGURAL EDITION

The Innovation Party Platform

Generated Jul 6, 2026 from 55 issues across 13 domains, each one sourced and argued against its own strongest counterargument.

Introduction

This is the Innovation Party's second platform.

The first, published in 2024, made a claim: govern by evidence, not by which side of an old argument you happen to stand on. It backed that claim with one plank on artificial intelligence and thirty-one on everything else, argued well in places, but argued as prose, with no source attached to any of it.

This document is what happened when we went and did the work. Artificial intelligence alone is now thirteen separate issues, because treating "AI" as one plank turned out to be exactly as useless as treating "the economy" as one. Fifty-five issues in total, each with its own sources and its own written case against the strongest version of the argument on the other side, not the weakest one. Two issues exist now that didn't exist in 2024 at all: a presidency statutorily exempt from the conflicts-of-interest law everyone else follows, and an inspector-general removal standard a federal court found unlawful and then declined to enforce. Neither showed up because we went looking for new planks to add. They showed up because 2025 and 2026 happened, and we rebuilt the platform to match.

Every claim in this document traces to a real, named source, listed alongside the issue that uses it. That's the standard we're holding ourselves to: read any position here, follow it back to what it's built on, and judge for yourself.

Core Values

Six values have anchored this platform since 2024. They haven't changed, because nothing that's happened since gave us a reason to change them — only reasons to take them more seriously. Every issue in this platform declares one of these six as its primary alignment; you can browse the whole platform by value, not just by domain, in the Platform Explorer.

Access to Information and Connectivity

- We believe in freedom of information for an informed society.
- We defend online freedom of expression and user rights.
- We uphold the principle of net neutrality to ensure an open internet.
- We address the digital divide and seek equitable connectivity for all.

Privacy, Security, and Trust

- We prioritize cybersecurity to protect privacy and national security.
- We safeguard privacy and individual rights in a digital age.
- We emphasize transparency and accountability in governance.
- We advocate for building trust in digital services and technology.

Technology for Human Welfare and Sustainability

- We ensure technology serves human welfare and society.
- We champion sustainable development and clean tech.
- We support the use of technology to mitigate climate change.
- We promote ethical AI and responsible data usage for societal good.

Inclusive Growth and Economic Development

- We stand for inclusivity, diversity, and access to technology.
- We back policies driving economic growth, job creation, and small-business growth.
- We foster a favorable environment for technology startups.
- We encourage responsible innovation for the benefit of all.

Education and Digital Literacy

- We empower individuals through education and lifelong learning.
- We advocate for digital literacy as essential for informed decision-making.

- We enhance tech-focused curricula and training programs.
- We ensure equal access to educational technology for everyone.

Research, Innovation, and Collaboration

- We pursue investment in emerging technologies for future advancement.
- We advocate for technology in advancing scientific discovery and research.
- We endorse open-source development and collaboration.
- We value international partnerships to address shared challenges.

The Charter of Innovation

This is the same Charter of Innovation every new member reads and signs when they join. It hasn't changed since 2024, and it isn't a policy document — it's the values pledge everything else in this platform has to answer to.

In the august assembly of our fellowship, we steadfastly dedicate ourselves to the immutable truths and values we hold sacrosanct. Foremost among these tenets is the profound precept of innovation, an ideal which bears immense weight, particularly when examining social questions, for it represents the drive to create and implement new ideas, technologies, and policies to improve the human condition.

Today we introduce a new political dimension which transcends the conventional dichotomy of liberal versus conservative, or libertarian versus authoritarian, for a more modern alignment: innovation versus inertia; where innovation represents progress, and inertia represents the resistance to change and the maintenance of the status quo.

Innovation is an exalted virtue that transcends mere political stratagems. It fosters inclusivity, compassion, and a discourse marked by openness and mutual respect. We acknowledge the rich tapestry of perspectives and experiences that constitute our society, and cherish the unique voice each person brings to the table. Through our dedication to innovation, we strive to cultivate an embracing and respectful haven where people may express themselves authentically and engage with societal matters in harmony with their beliefs and principles.

Furthermore, we pledge ourselves to the cardinal values of: unfettered expression, technological advancement, unconditional empathy, responsible industry, mutual respect, organizational transparency, individual accountability, and personal integrity. These principles mirror our profound comprehension of the far-reaching influence of technology and social concerns upon our world. Embracing these values empowers us to address the challenges and seize the opportunities of the 21st century and beyond, ultimately benefitting all, irrespective of their origins or convictions.

Innovation is an inherent inclination of the human spirit. Our childhood curiosity led us to gaze up at the heavens in wonder, seeking to unravel the mysteries of the vast universe. Witnessing the first steps of humankind on the moon filled us with awe, evoking the boundless potential of human ingenuity. Yet, the emergence of the atom bomb also elicited a sense of abject horror, a reminder of the grave consequences that technology can unleash in the absence of empathy and responsibility. These events serve as a poignant reminder of the power and responsibility we hold as individuals, and the pivotal role innovation plays in shaping our collective future.

The pursuit of innovation must be tempered by a deep sense of stewardship and a commitment to ethical considerations. As a collective, we maintain that technological progress serves not as an ultimate goal but as a conduit to enhance human welfare, preserve the planet in perpetuity, foster

economic prosperity, and engender a more equitable and just society. We recognize that the world's complexity calls for adaptability and responsiveness within our ranks, ensuring that our fellowship remains at the forefront of human progress while maintaining fidelity to our core values.

To realize the full potential of innovation, we emphasize the importance of cultivating lifelong learning, fostering curiosity, and nurturing critical thinking. Through education and by empowering individuals to continually grow and adapt, we contribute to the development of resilient and compassionate citizens, capable of navigating the complex lessons and challenges of past times, present times, and future times.

We are committed to fostering open dialogue and understanding within our fellowship, respecting the right of each member to maintain their personal and moral interpretations concerning social issues. By nurturing an environment where a diverse array of viewpoints can coexist harmoniously, we can create a vibrant and dynamic political landscape.

We recognize that the document we present today, the Charter of Innovation, represents more than just a set of principles and values. It is a testament to the enduring human spirit of collaboration, progress, and justice. It represents a legacy that has been handed down through generations, from the earliest pioneers of human thought and achievement to the present day.

Through our steadfast dedication to the principles and values enshrined in this document, we hope to create a brighter future not just for ourselves, but for our children, and our children's children, and for all those who come after. We acknowledge with soberness and awe that our actions today will shape the course of human history, and we are committed to forging a path that leads to a more just, equitable, and compassionate world.

We invite all who share our commitment to these principles and values to join us in this noble pursuit. Together, we can create a world where innovation is valued, where freedom of expression is cherished, where technological progress is harnessed for the betterment of humanity, where compassion and respect are foundational, where transparency and accountability are paramount, and where integrity guides our actions. Let us unite in purpose and progress, to build a brighter and more prosperous future for all.

Innovation vs. Inertia

Our 2024 platform put it this way: don't ask whether a policy is left or right, ask whether it moves things forward. That's a fine slogan. It's also exactly the kind of sentence any party could sign regardless of what they believe, which is a problem we're old enough now to notice in our own writing.

Here's the same idea, stated so you can check it instead of just trusting it: every issue in this platform is tagged, in its own metadata, as either procedural or normative. Procedural means a fix to how government does something (a capacity gap, an enforcement hole, a process nobody designed on purpose) that we think should hold regardless of who's in charge, the same way a bridge repair doesn't have a party affiliation. Normative means a values call: a place where we tell you plainly which value we're choosing and why, not neutral and not disguised as neutral. Of the 55 issues in this platform, 42 are procedural and 13 are normative. You can check which is which for any issue on this platform, not just take our word for the ratio.

That split is also our answer to "wedge issues." Our 2024 platform said members don't have to agree with every plank to belong, and we're keeping that commitment, but making it specific instead of just declaring it. The 42 procedural issues are the ones we think you should be able to agree with no matter where you started. The 13 normative issues are where we're not hiding anything: we picked a side, and we'll tell you which one and why every time. Disagreeing with us on any one of those 13 doesn't make you less of a member here.

We don't build this distinction because we think politics should be boring. We build it because "we're not left or right" is a claim every failed third party has made, and the only way to make it mean something is to show the work, issue by issue, instead of asserting it once at the front of a document and hoping nobody checks page 40.

What Changed Since 2024

Every plank in our 2024 platform is accounted for below. None of them just vanished. We tracked what happened to each one, and you can check the same table we did.

Two planks turned out to already be AI issues wearing a different name: Autonomous Vehicles folded into a broader Robotics & Embodied AI issue, and Automation folded into AI & Labor Markets. Artificial Intelligence itself, a single plank in 2024, is now thirteen: the clearest sign of how much a "we'll figure out AI later" plank was hiding.

Seven planks were carried forward as a starting draft and then substantively rebuilt: new proposals, a stress test against the strongest objection to each one, an honest account of who bears the cost, sources that didn't exist in the original text. Thirty-three more were re-researched from the ground up, keeping only the original plank's topic, not a sentence of its 2024 argument. Two issues exist now with no 2024 origin at all: a presidency statutorily exempt from ordinary conflicts-of-interest law, and an inspector-general removal standard a federal court found unlawful and declined to enforce. Neither gap was visible yet in 2024.

None of that is a rebrand. It's the difference between a platform that states a position once and one that shows you, issue by issue, when it was last checked and what it's built on. That's the same standard we asked you to hold the 2024 document to, applied to ourselves this time.

The appendix has the full plank-by-plank table: every 2024 title, where it lives now, and what changed.

Artificial Intelligence

In 2024 this was one plank. It's thirteen now, because "AI" was never one policy question. It was at least thirteen: what a model can be trained on, who's liable when a fine-tuned copy causes harm, whether frontier labs or the government sets safety standards, what happens to labor markets, who gets to hold open-weight models, and more. Treating it as one plank in 2024 meant every one of those questions got the same one-size answer. It doesn't anymore.

AI-01 — Generative AI: Text, Image, Video & Audio Synthesis

Require consent and compensation for a real person's likeness or voice, and disclosure of synthetic commercial content, through state law and industry standards, since federal enforcement here reversed in 2025.

This issue is distinct from AI-10, which covers whether a model may train on copyrighted creative work at all. This issue covers what happens on the output side: should AI-generated commercial content be disclosed, and does using a real, identifiable person's voice or likeness require their consent and compensation. The federal regulatory picture here has moved backward: in December 2025, the FTC vacated its own model AI-fake-review enforcement action, reasoning that restricting a technology over potential misuse "unduly burdens AI innovation." Progress on both disclosure and likeness-consent has instead come from states and negotiated industry agreements.

Proposals:

1. Support state-level AI-content disclosure laws, following New York's requirement to disclose AI-generated "synthetic performers" in paid advertising, and California's requirement that large providers offer free detection tools, rather than relying on federal enforcement that reversed its own prior position in this exact area.
2. Support a federal floor requiring consent and compensation for commercial use of a real person's digital voice or likeness. This isn't a hypothetical ask: the NO FAKES Act already does exactly this, and its sponsor list crosses the aisle — Rep. Salazar (R) and Rep. Dean (D) in the House, Sen. Blackburn (R) and Sen. Coons (D) in the Senate. Model the federal floor on the entertainment-industry union's negotiated consent-and-compensation framework and New York's estate-consent requirement for deceased performers. This protects performance and likeness, a distinct right from AI-10's training-data compensation for training-corpus contribution.
3. Support continued industry adoption of content-provenance standards as the primary practical disclosure mechanism, while being honest that the standard breaks down once content crosses a platform that strips metadata during re-encoding, the same limitation already named in AI-13.

4. Don't restrict or cap AI-generated creative content itself. Market disruption in several creative professions is documented below, but it doesn't currently justify prohibition any more than AI-11's labor data justifies a broader ban on AI-assisted work. Support targeted disclosure and consent requirements instead.
5. Support platform-level accountability for undisclosed synthetic content that could deceive consumers about a work's authorship or a performer's participation, a market-integrity concern narrower than and distinct from the election-specific deception already covered in AI-13.
6. Require platforms that host AI-generated content at commercial scale — marketplaces, video platforms, app stores — to implement working provenance and quality enforcement, not nominal policy language: the same identity-verification standard a major bookseller now applies to publishing accounts should be the floor other large platforms are held to, and platforms that knowingly profit from mass low-quality synthetic content impersonating authorship (fake books mimicking an author's catalog, AI-generated local "news" sites impersonating journalism) should face accountability for it before press coverage forces the issue. Scale the obligation to platform size — a revenue or user-count threshold, consistent with the safe-harbor approach this platform already uses in AI-05 and AI-10 — so the standard targets the marketplaces large enough to be a meaningful vector for this harm, not every small platform regardless of exposure.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-02 — Large Language Models & Frontier Model Safety

Frontier models above a defined capability threshold need a codified, transparent federal safety-review process, replacing the ad hoc Cabinet-level negotiation used in the 2026 Fable 5/Mythos 5 case.

Frontier models — systems above a defined training-compute or capability threshold — warrant a distinct regulatory tier from ordinary software. Not because AI is dangerous by nature, but because a small number of systems now have plausible large-scale misuse or failure modes (bio/cyber uplift, autonomous action at scale) that ordinary product-liability law was never built for. The party takes no position on whether AI itself is good or bad. The position is procedural: match the tier of oversight to the tier of capability, and keep the process public and predictable.

That's not an abstract concern. In June 2026, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick ordered Anthropic to cut off Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for every foreign national worldwide, including Anthropic's own overseas employees, over a discovered jailbreak vulnerability, on a model already running for hundreds of millions of users. Resolving it took eighteen to nineteen days of direct, undocumented negotiation between one company and one federal department: no public standard, no timeline, no appeal path. That's the pattern this issue exists to end.

Proposals:

1. A federal frontier-model safety-reporting requirement, triggered by defined compute thresholds, modeled on the disclosure/incident-reporting structures states have already built (New York's RAISE Act, California's SB 53) rather than every state reinventing its own bar.
2. A standing interagency review process for national-security-flagged model behavior, with a fixed timeline and a defined appeal path. A case resolves through a known process, not weeks of ad hoc negotiation between a Cabinet secretary and a company's leadership.
3. A federal minimum floor with room for states to add sector-specific rules on top, instead of either a blanket federal preemption or an unbounded 50-state patchwork.
4. A public incident registry for confirmed frontier-model safety failures, so policy debate runs on shared facts instead of partisan anecdote.
5. A mandatory sunset/review clause on any new frontier-safety rule. A technology moving this fast shouldn't get permanent rules that never get checked against reality.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-03 — AI Coding & Software Development Tools

Federal high-risk code should get continuous AI-assisted review, active monitoring, and fast, verified autonomous patching for confirmed vulnerabilities.

AI coding assistants are now central to how software gets built, and the shift happened fast. At one major technology company, the share of new code that's AI-generated climbed from roughly a quarter in late 2024 to about three-quarters by mid-2026. A large, methodologically disclosed 2026 developer survey found 90% of professional developers already use at least one AI coding tool at work. That adoption reflects a technology earning its place: it measurably speeds up delivery, and the large majority of that code ships without incident.

One finding is worth taking seriously alongside that success. Developers using AI coding assistants write less secure code on average, and are more likely to believe their code is secure than developers without one. This is distinct from AI-11's broader AI-and-labor question, which covers the employment effects of AI on software engineering as an occupation; this issue is about supply-chain security specifically, and what standard code has to clear before it ships into a system where a lapse actually costs something.

Human sign-off doesn't scale to the volume of AI-generated code already shipping, and a rubber-stamp review is worse than no review: it creates the appearance of scrutiny without the substance. The mechanism that actually works is already proven at real scale. DARPA's 2025 AI Cyber Challenge ran seven autonomous systems against five real open-source codebases, including the Linux kernel, for

143 hours, with no human sign-off on any individual fix: they found 86% of the seeded test vulnerabilities, patched 68% of what they found, and along the way discovered and patched real, previously-unknown vulnerabilities in that same production code. Google's "Big Sleep" AI agent caught a critical SQLite vulnerability that threat actors already knew about, months before it would otherwise have been found. GitHub's Copilot Autofix cuts the median time to fix a known vulnerability class from about an hour and a half to under thirty minutes. None of this replaces professional accountability: a developer who ships code into a security-sensitive system is held to the same standard of care regardless of whether a human or a model wrote the first draft. It replaces the idea that a human has to be the one checking every line for that accountability to mean something.

Proposals:

1. Require continuous automated security review for AI-assisted code in security-sensitive and safety-sensitive federal systems: static and dynamic analysis plus frontier-model-assisted review run against every change, not a one-time gate sampled or scheduled after the fact.
2. Require frontier-model-assisted review specifically for high-risk, high-impact code across federal agencies, scaled by risk tier the same way this platform already scales frontier-model oversight generally (see AI-02), not a blanket mandate applied to every commit everywhere.
3. Fund continuous production monitoring for federal high-risk systems, with a verified autonomous-patch pipeline for confirmed vulnerabilities that fall into a known-safe fix class. CISA's own June 2026 risk-tiered patching directive already requires federal agencies to fix the highest-risk known vulnerabilities within three days; hitting that window at agency scale needs exactly this kind of pipeline. A human engineer stays in the loop for anything outside a known-safe fix class.
4. Keep policy language precise about what's being measured: a coding assistant generating insecure code is a different failure mode from a vulnerability in the AI tooling infrastructure itself, and the two shouldn't get conflated in how incidents are reported or regulated.
5. Calibrate any future policy threshold on independently reproducible measurement of these tools' real-world performance, treating vendor-published statistics as one directional data point among several.

Last reviewed Jul 6, 2026

AI-04 — Robotics & Embodied AI

Physical AI needs federal AV liability standards and a dedicated OSHA workplace-safety rule, replacing today's case-by-case exemptions, voluntary consensus standards, and jury-by-jury outcomes.

Embodied AI's failure modes are physical, not informational. A defect causes an injury or a death, not a bad answer. That changes what "safety regulation" needs to mean, and current US policy hasn't caught

up: there is no federal autonomous-vehicle liability framework (states handle it inconsistently, and the default is ordinary product-liability litigation, jury by jury), and OSHA has no dedicated standard for human-robot workplace collaboration at all, relying entirely on voluntary industry consensus standards with no enforcement teeth. This issue absorbs the 2024 platform's separate "Autonomous Vehicles" plank — a self-driving car is an embodied-AI application, not its own category, and treating it as one was part of the "AI lumped together" problem this taxonomy exists to fix.

Proposals:

1. Support federal AV legislation that pairs vehicle design standards with a liability-allocation framework, not just the current pattern of case-by-case NHTSA exemptions and standard amendments with no liability component at all.
2. OSHA should issue a dedicated collaborative/humanoid robot workplace safety standard, rather than relying entirely on voluntary consensus standards that carry no enforcement mechanism. Commercial deployment scale already justifies this.
3. Require standardized, audited incident and operating-hours reporting for commercially deployed robots and AVs, separating verified operational data from promotional claims. Some coverage counts over a thousand Tesla Optimus units "working" in its factories. Elon Musk himself said, in January 2026, that Optimus was still "in the R&D phase" and "not in usage in our factories in a material way." When a company's own CEO won't back its marketing, self-reported numbers aren't a reporting standard.
4. Support narrow, procurement-specific national-security restrictions on foreign-adversary -origin robotics for federal use, distinct from broader domestic robotics safety regulation.
5. Retire the 2024 platform's separate Autonomous Vehicles plank into this issue.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-05 — Fine-Tuning, Model Customization & Derivative Liability

Base-model developers should be liable by default; fine-tuners and deployers should be liable for substantial modifications or intentional misuse.

The honest starting point here is that this question is nearly untested in court. Two teenagers died; two wrongful-death suits followed. Both name a company that is simultaneously the base-model developer and the deployer, so neither case presents the scenario this issue is about: a harm caused by an *independent* third party fine-tuning or wrapping someone else's base model. Both suits ended in settlement. No admission of liability. No ruling on who was at fault. That gap is the reason this issue exists as a distinct question from AI-02's frontier-safety framework, which regulates the base-model layer but doesn't say who's liable once a downstream party has customized what gets deployed.

Proposals:

1. Support federal legislation establishing base-model developer liability by default, with fine-tuners and deployers liable specifically for substantial modifications or intentional misuse: a defined allocation, not something re-litigated from scratch in every case.
2. Use a compute-based "substantial modification" threshold to make that line administrable, consistent with how this platform already uses compute thresholds elsewhere (AI-02, AI-06) rather than a vaguer case-by-case judgment call.
3. Treat AI-generated output as not covered by Section 230's third-party-content immunity, consistent with that statute's own authors' stated view. This doesn't decide who's liable; it just means ordinary product-liability and negligence law, not a 230 threshold dismissal, is what decides it.
4. Support a rebuttable "stewardship defense" for base-model providers who can document safety controls and cooperation with downstream fine-tuners, an incentive to build safer base models, not a liability shield for box-checking.
5. Revisit this position as case law develops. This is stated plainly rather than as a hedge: almost no court has yet allocated fault between a base-model developer and an independent third-party fine-tuner in a final judgment.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-06 — Open-Weight vs. Closed-Weight Model Policy

A dangerous-capability threshold should trigger safety evaluation before an irrevocable open-weight release, since a closed model can still be patched afterward and an open one cannot.

Current federal policy already treats open-weight release as geostrategically valuable, not inherently dangerous. The 2025 "AI Action Plan" explicitly frames open models as tools for extending American standards globally, and export-control rules have historically exempted openly-released model weights from the controls applied to closed ones. The party's position doesn't fight that framing. It adds one precise safeguard current policy is missing: release timing. A closed model that turns out to have a dangerous capability can be patched, restricted, or pulled after the fact, as the 2026 Fable 5/Mythos 5 case showed, however messy that process was. An open-weight model cannot. Once weights are public, there is no recall. Researchers demonstrated exactly what that means in practice: stripping Llama 3's safety training took minutes to half an hour on a single consumer GPU, and WormGPT, a tool built specifically for phishing and malware, started in 2023 as someone's fine-tune of an open-weight model. A closed model can be patched after a demonstration like that. An open one can only be watched.

Proposals:

1. Use the same capability-based evaluation threshold from AI-02 to trigger pre-release review: not a separate, redundant "open-weight tax" applied regardless of what a model can do.
2. For a model that crosses that threshold, require the evaluation to complete *before* an irrevocable open-weight release specifically: a narrow, capability-triggered release-timing rule, not a blanket restriction on releasing weights openly.
3. Continue supporting open-weight competitiveness as policy, consistent with the platform's core value of open-source development and collaboration. A specific release narrowing a geopolitical capability gap is a national-security monitoring question for AI-07, not a reason to restrict domestic open-weight releases generally.
4. Support narrow, procurement-specific restrictions on federal use of adversary-origin open-weight models, distinct from restricting Americans' ability to release or use open-weight models generally.
5. Fund independent, ongoing monitoring of the open-weight risk/benefit balance, so "benefits currently outweigh risks" stays a continuously-checked finding instead of a single assessment left to quietly go stale.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-07 — US-China AI Competition & Compute/Export Controls

Chip and compute export policy should be a published, tiered, allied-coordinated framework, separate from AI-02's dedicated safety-review process.

The lever in the "AI race" is the compute supply chain, not slogans about who's ahead. The party's position is procedural: which specific chokepoints deserve export control (advanced AI-training chips, not general-purpose semiconductors), how licensing decisions get made (a predictable, published process, not case-by-case negotiation), and how to stop the current pattern of policy reversing wholesale with every administration.

That's not a hypothetical risk. In June 2026, Commerce used export-control authority, the kind written for hardware crossing a border, to cut off Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for foreign nationals anywhere in the world, including Anthropic's own employees outside the US. The suspension was lifted by July 1, but a reversal isn't a rule against it happening again. Nothing currently stops the next administration from reaching for the same authority over model behavior instead of hardware.

Proposals:

1. A tiered chip export-control framework based on capability thresholds (training-cluster scale, compute-per-dollar), reviewed on a fixed cadence, instead of blanket bans, blanket exemptions, or ad hoc country-by-country deals renegotiated every few months.

2. Codified end-use/"known customer" verification requirements for advanced compute sales, so labs and cloud providers have a clear compliance target instead of case-by-case rulings.
3. A firm line between export/trade authority and AI-safety authority (see AI-02): a company's own model shouldn't be suspended through open-ended export law when the concern is model *behavior*, not hardware leaving the country.
4. Allied coordination (with the EU, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, the chokepoints in the chip supply chain) over unilateral action that mostly just reroutes trade around US suppliers.
5. A mandatory sunset/review clause on specific export rules, given how fast both the technology and the diplomatic relationship move.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-08 — AI, Cybersecurity & Catastrophic Dual-Use Risk

Gene-synthesis screening should be mandatory for every commercial provider, and AI cyber-offensive-capability evaluation should be a statutory duty inside AI-02's framework.

Two incidents in the last year show this risk is neither theater nor speculation. Anthropic disclosed in November 2025 that a Chinese state-sponsored group manipulated its Claude Code tool into an autonomous espionage campaign against roughly thirty organizations, executing most of the attack tactics with minimal human input. This was the first publicly documented large-scale AI-orchestrated intrusion. Separately, Microsoft researchers used open-source AI protein-design tools to generate tens of thousands of redesigned toxin variants and found most evaded commercial gene-synthesis screening software. That's an information hazard the researchers handled responsibly, but one that exposed a gap in the screening infrastructure meant to catch exactly this. Both incidents were caught; neither was prevented by a mandatory legal requirement, because none currently exists for either domain.

Proposals:

1. Make nucleic acid synthesis screening mandatory for all commercial gene-synthesis providers, not just those receiving federal funding, closing the documented gap around benchtop synthesizers that sit outside every current framework.
2. Fold AI cyber-offensive-capability evaluation into the same statutory frontier-model reporting duty proposed in AI-02, rather than leaving it as a voluntary, agreement-by-agreement arrangement between individual labs and government evaluators.
3. Require labs to report the fact and general risk category of any dangerous-capability threshold crossing to the same registry proposed in AI-02, even when detailed evaluation methodology stays appropriately confidential to avoid becoming its own information hazard.

4. Fund independent evaluation capacity. Self-reported grading is currently the primary accountability mechanism industry-wide, and a 2025 industry-wide safety assessment found only a minority of major labs report substantive dangerous-capability testing at all. Several of those same labs publicly claim near-term transformative capability anyway.
5. Calibrate future thresholds against documented incidents: not speculative worst-case scenarios, and not dismissive claims that current safeguards are theater, since both incidents above involved measurable uplift *and* were caught by existing measures.
6. Create a structured early-access program, not a negotiated one, giving vetted critical-infrastructure operators (utilities, hospitals, water systems) access to frontier defensive security capability on a fixed schedule ahead of general public release. Model both the operator vetting and the frontier-lab qualification on processes that already work this way: ISACs' tiered information-sharing for vetted members, and NIST's publish-the-test-battery-in-advance approach to post-quantum cryptography standardization. Every lab that clears the same published technical bar qualifies to participate; none gets in through a closed-door deal.

Last reviewed Jul 6, 2026

AI-09 — Autonomous Weapons & Military AI

The military's human-judgment requirement over lethal force should be statute, not a directive an administration can rewrite in 90 days, as the 2026 Anthropic-Pentagon standoff shows.

This isn't a hypothetical policy debate. It's what already happened. In early 2026, the Department of Defense reportedly sought "unrestricted" access to Anthropic's Claude — for mass domestic surveillance, and for fully autonomous weapons. Anthropic said no to both. Its CEO didn't hedge: current frontier models, he said, are "not reliable enough" for autonomous lethal force. The administration didn't take no for an answer. It ordered federal agencies to stop using Anthropic's products and designated the company a supply-chain risk instead. A federal court didn't accept that either — it blocked the designation by preliminary injunction, upheld on appeal; the underlying legal questions remain unresolved.

Notice what's missing from that entire sequence: a statute. A standard. Anything Congress actually wrote down. What stopped this dispute from escalating further wasn't law. It was one company's engineers, one CEO's public refusal, and judicial review holding up on appeal. That held, this time. The next standoff like it gets decided by whoever happens to be willing to say no, unless a real process exists on the books before it starts — right now, there is only unilateral executive action followed by litigation, and nothing prevents the next disagreement from resolving the opposite way.

Proposals:

1. Codify the military's existing human-judgment-over-lethal-force requirement in statute, so it can't be rewritten by directive alone on a 90-day political timeline.
2. Support the recurring bipartisan ban on autonomous nuclear-launch authority as an uncontroversial floor, independent of where the broader autonomous-weapons debate lands.
3. Route military AI capability review through the same interagency board proposed in AI-02, rather than leaving disputes like the 2026 standoff to unilateral executive action and after-the-fact litigation.
4. Continue US engagement in the UN process on lethal autonomous weapons without accepting a treaty text that doesn't yet exist. But state publicly what a text would need to include for the US to support one, rather than indefinite, unexplained blocking.
5. Where battlefield AI-targeting reporting is contested, as with disputed characterizations of Israeli systems in Gaza, this platform doesn't adjudicate facts it cannot verify. It holds only that a human-judgment standard fails if review time is measured in seconds, regardless of what any specific system is called.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-10 — AI & Copyright / Training Data Rights

Training on copyrighted work isn't plagiarism, but commercial training access should be compensated through a collective-licensing marketplace that pays individual creators, not just large rights-holders.

This is one of the few issues in this platform where the party takes an explicit, substantive position rather than a purely procedural one.

Training a model on published material is closer to a student doing research than to plagiarism: synthesis — reading broadly and forming new statistical associations — isn't the same act as reproducing someone's expression verbatim. Copyright enforcement should focus on **outputs**: if a generated output substantially reproduces protected expression, that's an infringement question like any other, regardless of whether an AI or a human produced it. The fact that a model learned from copyrighted material during training is not itself the harm, any more than a human author having read the material is.

That does not mean training access should be free. When a commercial model trains on someone's copyrighted creative work, the rights-holder is owed compensation for that use: not because training is theft, but because it's a commercial input like any other, the same way a sample, a cover, or a broadcast performance already requires payment under existing copyright law.

Right now, almost none of that payment happens. AI labs are already signing these licensing deals, with publishers, with stock-photo agencies, with record labels. They are not signing them with the individual artist or author whose work trained the model. Training access could be a monetization channel for exactly the working creators currently locked out of one.

Proposals:

1. Codify substantially-similar/verbatim *output* — not training — as the copyright infringement trigger for AI-generated content, consistent with how infringement already works for human-created derivative works.
2. A federal framework for collective licensing of commercial AI training on copyrighted creative works, opt-in for individual creators, but structured so payment reaches individual creators directly, not only the publishers and aggregators who currently cut these deals on their behalf.
3. A training-data transparency/disclosure requirement, in the spirit of the pending bipartisan TRAIN Act, so creators can find out whether their work was used before they can be paid for it.
4. Keep noncommercial and research use on the existing fair-use path. This framework targets commercial frontier-model training specifically, not every use of a dataset.
5. A safe-harbor compliance path for smaller and open-source developers, so a licensing requirement doesn't become a moat only the largest labs can afford.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-11 — AI & Labor Markets

Target labor-market policy at AI's measured effect on entry-level workers in high-exposure occupations, not at the broader collapse or non-effect narratives dominating public debate.

The honest answer, given current evidence, doesn't sit at either extreme of the public debate. Start with the payroll data: workers 22 to 25 in the most AI-exposed occupations, employment down 16% since late 2022. Workers 30 and older, the same occupations, the same period, employment up 6 to 12%. A generic economic headwind does not do that. It does not hit one age cohort in a job and lift the other in the identical job. "AI job loss is a myth used to excuse layoffs that would have happened anyway" cannot explain a divergence that specific.

Nor is this a collapse. The most careful conservative modeling available puts AI's added economic output at around 0.71% over the next decade, far below the more excited industry forecasts. The party's position doesn't require picking a winner in that broader academic debate. It targets policy at what's been measured: a concentrated effect on a specific population, not (yet) evidence of broad labor-market collapse.

Proposals:

1. Portable, non-employer-tied transition support (modernized unemployment insurance, portable training accounts) targeted at the population the data implicates — entry-level workers in highly AI-exposed occupations — rather than a universal response sized to worst-case projections.
2. A standing, public labor-market monitoring function — an official-statistics equivalent of the best current academic tracking — so policy doesn't depend indefinitely on one research team's proprietary dataset.
3. No blanket AI-hiring bans or mandated human-in-the-loop staffing quotas. Given good-faith disagreement among economists about whether current displacement is durable or a temporary reallocation (jobs have historically moved, not simply vanished), a heavy mandate risks freezing in place a response to a snapshot that keeps changing.
4. Retraining and education pathways specifically built around the occupations showing measured exposure, not a generic "AI literacy" curriculum.
5. Explicit rejection, in the platform's own words, of both rhetorical extremes: the data available does not support "this is a myth," and it does not support "this is a collapse."

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-12 — Deepfakes & Synthetic Media Authentication

Support the federal NCII takedown law's criminal core, but add the counter-notice safeguard it currently lacks to protect legitimate speech.

The general, non-election version of the deepfake problem — non-consensual intimate imagery, voice-cloning fraud, and commercial impersonation — now has federal criminal law behind it. It passed about as close to unanimously as anything gets through Congress: 409-2 in the House, unanimous in the Senate, co-authored by Sen. Cruz (R) and Sen. Klobuchar (D). That law took effect in 2025, with platform takedown obligations enforceable since May 2026, and enforcement has started, including a first criminal conviction.

One piece was left unbuilt. The law's takedown mechanism has no counter-notice process and no explicit carve-out for newsworthy content, satire, or art. A 48-hour compliance clock with no safeguard against bad-faith takedown requests is a risk to legitimate speech, not a hypothetical one.

Proposals:

1. Support the law's criminal NCII provisions as already appropriately targeted, but add a short, expedited counter-notice and anti-abuse mechanism plus an explicit newsworthy/public-interest carve-out to its platform takedown requirement.
2. Support passage of the pending federal civil right-of-action bill for NCII victims as a complement to criminal enforcement. It doesn't touch Section 230, so it doesn't raise the platform-liability concerns

a broader proposal would.

3. Strengthen state Attorneys General authority and multi-state coordination for NCII/"nudify app" enforcement specifically. This is where most enforcement against that ecosystem has come from so far, not the new federal apparatus, and that pattern deserves reinforcement rather than being treated as a stopgap.
4. Support financial-institution verification-protocol requirements — out-of-band confirmation for high-value wire transfers — as a practical mitigation for voice-cloning fraud specifically, matching the vulnerability shown in the highest-profile documented case.
5. Support continued adoption of the same content-provenance standard AI-01 and AI-13 already reference, while being explicit about its two structural limits: most platforms strip the credential on re-encoding, and it doesn't survive an open-weight model with the embedding deliberately stripped.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

AI-13 — AI & Elections / Synthetic Political Media

Election-deepfake law should target false statements about voting mechanics narrowly, rather than broad "deceptive content" bans that keep losing in court.

The litigation record shows a central tension. Broad election-deepfake laws that ban or compel disclosure of "materially deceptive" content keep losing in court on First Amendment grounds. Doing nothing has its own record too: the consultant behind the AI-cloned Biden robocall that prompted the FCC's own ruling was acquitted on all 22 state criminal counts, and a follow-on $22,500 civil judgment against him is reportedly still being defied. A law that never gets passed and a law that gets struck down in court leave the voter in the same place: unprotected.

The party's position: narrow the legal target to what's defensible: false statements about voting mechanics (time, place, and manner of voting), rather than broad "materially deceptive content" bans, since courts have consistently upheld the narrow category while striking down the broad one.

Proposals:

1. Support deepfake-election laws narrowly targeted at false statements about voting mechanics, not broad "materially deceptive content" bans. The narrow category is the one most likely to survive First Amendment review given the current litigation record.
2. A uniform federal disclosure standard for AI content specifically in *paid* political advertising (not organic political speech), resolving the current three-way jurisdictional gap between the FEC's non-binding guidance, the FCC's stalled rulemaking, and the absence of any federal election-deepfake statute.

3. Expedited judicial review for deepfake claims filed close to an election: by the time a normal case resolves, the election is over, so speed of remedy matters as much as the rule itself.
4. Support platform-level provenance standards (e.g., C2PA content credentials) as a non-legal complement, since detection technology structurally lags generation technology and legal enforcement has so far produced almost no consequences.
5. Explicit, broad parody/satire carve-outs: narrow enough scope elsewhere in the statute means a carve-out doesn't have to do all the constitutional work by itself.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

Digital Rights & Privacy

Three issues, two of them carried forward from 2024's privacy plank and blockchain-ID plank and substantively rebuilt since, one drafted new to cover the accountability and transparency ground neither of the others reached. This domain is where "innovation, not inertia" gets tested against the oldest tension in tech policy: the same data infrastructure that makes services better is the one that makes surveillance easier.

PRIV-01 — Digital Privacy Rights: A Framework of Accountability

A federal data-privacy framework modeled on the EU's GDPR and California's CCPA, enforced by a dedicated federal privacy agency, replacing the current fragmented, conflicting state-law patchwork.

The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: privacy and innovation should evolve together, not trade off against each other. The document's diagnosis is that personal data, once private, is now routinely collected, exploited, and sold, often without consent, while the US response has stayed a fragmented patchwork of state laws (in contrast to the EU's GDPR and California's own CCPA) after federal proposals like the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act and the Online Privacy Act stalled in Congress amid gridlock and industry resistance.

Proposals (as stated in the source document):

1. A federal digital privacy framework, drawing on GDPR and CCPA, creating one national data-protection standard rather than a state-by-state patchwork, giving businesses regulatory clarity while protecting individual rights.
2. A dedicated federal digital privacy agency to enforce the framework nationwide, coordinating with existing federal and state entities to eliminate conflicting rules.
3. Promotion of privacy-enhancing technologies and data-minimization practices as a default design principle.
4. Individual control: clear opt-out mechanisms and transparent data practices, with companies held accountable for how they handle sensitive information.
5. **(2026 addition)** Resolve, explicitly, the two questions that have killed federal privacy legislation twice already, rather than staying vague the way the original plank did. In 2022, a bill sponsored across party lines by Democrats and Republicans in both chambers passed committee 53-2. And it still died, not from gridlock, but because one committee chair withheld support over enforcement. In 2024, the sequel stripped civil-rights language specifically to win Republican support, and died anyway, over the same private-right-of-action fight. Two bipartisan bills. Zero laws. This plank

makes both calls up front: yes to a private right of action (an agency's enforcement bandwidth alone has proven to be a bottleneck every time this has been tried), and yes to federal preemption of conflicting state laws (anything less defeats Proposal 1's own point of replacing the patchwork rather than adding a fifty-first layer to it).

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

PRIV-02 — Blockchain IDs: Privacy and Security Without Sacrificing Control

A decentralized-ledger identity system that proves a fact, such as age or residency, without revealing the underlying data, useful for commerce and government services on its own merits.

Added as a minimal stub because DEM-02 (Blockchain Voting) names this specific technology as its own load-bearing prerequisite and can't be fully understood without it existing as an issue. The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: identity verification using decentralized ledger technology (DLT) instead of centralized databases, removing the single point of failure that makes conventional identity systems attractive breach targets. The core technical claim is selective disclosure via cryptographic methods including zero-knowledge proofs: proving a specific fact (you're old enough to buy something, you live in a certain jurisdiction) without revealing the underlying data (your exact birthdate, your exact address). No central authority handles authentication; the blockchain itself validates identity claims, and once a verification is recorded, the source document describes it as tamper-proof and immutable.

The document is explicit that this needs careful, deliberate rollout: "these systems must meet the highest standards of security, privacy, and accessibility before widespread adoption." It states its main anticipated *eventual* payoff as enabling secure blockchain voting per DEM-02. **2026 reframing:** DEM-02 itself now notes that the one US blockchain-voting pilot (West Virginia's Voatz program) was discontinued after a serious security audit. Voting has receded from live policy; it hasn't advanced toward it. This issue's technology doesn't need that fight won to matter: proving you're old enough to buy something, or that you live where you say you live, without ever handing over your exact birthdate or your exact address, already works today, on this issue's own terms, whether or not a single state ever runs a blockchain election. That's the use case this technology actually stands on, and it isn't contingent on DEM-02's more speculative one. **2026 addition:** any government deployment of this system should carry a statutory prohibition on backdoors and a warrant requirement for any compelled disclosure of the underlying data, a legal safeguard alongside the cryptographic one, not a substitute for it. It should also remain strictly optional: the conventional, non-digital verification process stays available and equally valid for anyone without a smartphone or the digital literacy to use the new system, so this technology adds a faster option without ever becoming the only one.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

PRIV-03 — Elevating Transparency: Usable Public Accountability Data

Make public accountability data usable: searchable, machine-readable, complete enough to audit, and bounded by privacy, security, and law-enforcement limits.

Transparency is not the same thing as dumping PDFs onto a website. It works when the public, journalists, watchdogs, Congress, researchers, and honest agencies can inspect what government is doing without needing a lawsuit, a vendor contract, or a data-cleaning team to decode it.

The current facts make this plank more concrete than the 2024 title. DOJ's FY2025 FOIA summary reported a record 1,707,197 FOIA requests and 1,635,055 processed requests. The federal government has FOIA.gov datasets, USAspending.gov, Data.gov, public AI use-case inventories, lobbying disclosure reports, and program inventories. The problem is not absence of portals. It is incompleteness, data quality, missing spending categories, weak linkage between programs and awards, late or inconsistent disclosures, and transparency systems that do not always support real audit.

Proposals:

1. Fund FOIA capacity around backlog reduction, proactive disclosure, case-management modernization, and public quarterly metrics. Agencies with high request volume should publish the records people repeatedly request before another requester has to ask.
2. Make federal transparency data machine-readable by default: stable APIs, bulk downloads, data dictionaries, source lineage, change logs, version history, and plain-language context for non-specialists.
3. Close federal spending gaps by requiring other transaction agreements, subawards, emergency spending, and program identifiers to be reported in ways that connect USAspending.gov, SAM.gov, the Federal Program Inventory, and agency performance data.
4. Keep public AI-use inventories and high-impact AI reporting mandatory, with summaries understandable enough for affected people to know when an agency is using AI in a consequential process.
5. Restore beneficial-ownership transparency where public money, foreign influence, or federal contracting is at stake, while respecting the reality that current FinCEN rules exempt domestic companies and U.S. persons from broad BOI reporting.
6. Strengthen lobbying and campaign-finance disclosure through validation, enforcement referrals, APIs, and searchable links between lobbyists, covered prior federal jobs, clients, contributions, contracts, and policy actions.

The party's position is not "publish everything." Classified, personal, law-enforcement, trade-secret, and security-sensitive information still need limits. The standard is useful transparency: publish what the public can safely use, in forms that make accountability possible.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Democracy & Elections

Four issues: two carried forward from 2024 (blockchain voting, campaign finance), two drafted fresh (algorithmic redistricting, limiting partisan influence), plus a cross-tag to the AI domain's issue on synthetic political media. This is the domain most directly about whether the mechanics of self-government keep working as the tools campaigns and administrators use keep changing.

DEM-01 — Algorithmic Redistricting: Prove the Map, Don't Just Draw It

Every proposed congressional map should be tested against a published, million-map algorithmic baseline before whichever body, commission or legislature, adopts the final lines.

Algorithmic tools belong in redistricting as a mandatory disclosure and detection layer feeding the body that draws the final map. Two Supreme Court rulings define the room this proposal has to work in. *Rucho v. Common Cause* (2019) closed federal courts to partisan-gerrymandering claims. *Louisiana v. Callais* (2026) narrowed the other tool available, now requiring a race-neutral illustrative map that also meets a state's own districting goals, not just evidence a map has a discriminatory effect, a bar scholars expect to be far harder to clear. With one door closed and the other narrower, what's left is what gets published before a map is adopted, and what a state court, a citizen commission, or the surviving federal claims can do with that evidence.

That's what computational redistricting already does, today, in production. RepresentUs and the Princeton Gerrymandering Project already run every state's adopted congressional map through an ensemble baseline of roughly a million alternative plans meeting the same population, contiguity, and compactness rules, then check whether the adopted map is a statistical outlier against it, publishing the results through their Redistricting Report Card. It has failed maps from both parties: Texas's Republican-drawn 2021 map and Illinois's, Maryland's, New York's, and Oregon's Democratic-drawn ones all received F grades in the same cycle. The tool doesn't pick a side. It picks outliers. MGGG's own GerryChain library, the open-source engine behind much of this ensemble work, has been used to evaluate maps in active litigation and in retrospective reviews of real commission cycles, including a 2024 joint assessment of Michigan's first full redistricting cycle with the advocacy group that helped create its commission.

Two things this position refuses to do. It won't hand the final decision to software: every serious implementation, including the Institute for Computational Redistricting's work with Arizona's independent commission and, in Missouri, with the League of Women Voters, produces evidence for a human body to weigh, never a map with legal force. And it won't treat "race-blind" as a synonym for neutral: an

ensemble built without racial data has been shown to significantly undercount minority-opportunity districts.

Proposals:

1. Require, as a condition of a congressional map taking effect, that it be tested against a published, race-neutral ensemble of at least one million alternative plans meeting the state's traditional redistricting criteria, with results public before final adoption.
2. Require a second, published audit using racial and language-minority population data, to catch the undercount a race-blind baseline produces (see Extended for why this is a second, separate analysis rather than folded into the first).
3. Fund the technical assistance, through federal grants, that lets any state run these analyses on existing open-source tools instead of leaving it to litigants who can afford expert witnesses.
4. Make this kind of ensemble analysis admissible as evidence in redistricting litigation, the same practice courts in Pennsylvania and North Carolina already accept.
5. When a commission deadlocks, as Virginia's did in 2021 before its Supreme Court stepped in with special masters, whoever draws the map next remains bound by the same requirement as every other map-drawer: test the result against the neutral ensemble before adoption, rather than being exempted from disclosure because the ordinary process broke down.

Editorial note: this issue is marked `stance_type: normative`, not procedural. Requiring the audit baseline to use racial data, rather than exclude it, takes an explicit side in a live debate over "race-blind" redistricting; a procedural framing would understate that this argues against a specific legal theory, not merely a process (see Extended for the full reasoning).

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

DEM-02 — Blockchain Voting: Only If We Get It Right

Blockchain voting should wait for a proven voter-identity system and federal security standards, given that the only U.S. pilot was discontinued after researchers found serious vulnerabilities.

The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: blockchain voting has potential (decentralized ledgers, cryptographic security, transparency), but the document is explicit that potential isn't permission. "It cannot be rushed; it must be earned." Its core structural argument is sequencing: don't build blockchain voting before the harder, prerequisite problem (secure voter identity authentication) is solved and proven at a smaller scale first.

Proposals (as stated in the source document):

1. Before any state adopts blockchain voting, first develop and implement a state-level blockchain ID system specifically to solve voter authentication: testing and refining identity verification, privacy, and access at a smaller scale before voting itself is on the line.
2. A bipartisan federal commission to set the standards blockchain voting must meet: rigorous testing, verified security, and a proven ability to serve voters fairly. Adoption is gated on meeting that standard, regardless of enthusiasm for the technology.
3. Federal funding and public-private partnerships to support R&D in both the prerequisite blockchain ID systems and voting technology itself.
4. **(2026 addition)** Say plainly what's happened since 2024: the one blockchain-voting pilot in US history (West Virginia's 2018 program for overseas military voters, using the Voatz app) was discontinued in 2020 after MIT security researchers found serious vulnerabilities. No state has run a live blockchain-voting program since. That's the caution being validated by the only test case available. Here's what would change that: a state-level blockchain ID system proven at smaller scale on a non-voting government service, and a blockchain-voting pilot that publishes its security audit and survives the same caliber of scrutiny that caught Voatz's flaws. Clear both, and the door opens. Until then, this remains a research-and-standards priority rather than a near-term deployment plan.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

DEM-03 — Campaign Financing Reform: Leveling the Playing Field

Reverse Citizens United through a constitutional amendment, expand public financing of campaigns, and require real-time disclosure of political contributions.

The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: money's influence on political outcomes needs structural reform, not just disclosure rules bolted onto the current system. The document's diagnosis centers on one Supreme Court decision: *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), which allowed corporations and labor unions to spend unlimited amounts on political communication and, in the document's account, undermined the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's (McCain-Feingold's) soft-money restrictions, leading to the proliferation of super PACs and independent-expenditure committees. The doctrine hasn't stood still since. On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court struck down coordinated-spending limits too, 6-3, tearing out a rule that had held for twenty-five years. A spending limit passed by ordinary legislation didn't survive that ruling, and the next spending-limit statute won't either. Only a change to the doctrine itself holds for that specific fight — disclosure requirements, like Proposal 3, rest on different constitutional footing and aren't at stake here.

Proposals (as stated in the source document):

1. A constitutional amendment reversing *Citizens United*, clarifying the legal distinction between corporate spending and individual spending in political campaigns.
2. Expanded public financing systems for political campaigns at both the federal and state levels, reducing candidates' dependence on wealthy donors.
3. Real-time disclosure requirements for all political contributions, so voters know who is financing a campaign as it happens rather than months later.

Editorial note: this issue is reclassified `stance_type: normative` in this pass. The original migration marked it `procedural`, but a position that sides explicitly with one side of a live, contested constitutional debate, as the Party Comparison section below makes clear this one does, isn't a neutral process recommendation, and the schema shouldn't pretend otherwise just because the 2024 source document didn't name the tension.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

DEM-04 — Limiting Partisan Influence: Certifying Elections Shouldn't Depend on Who Just Won

Certification of election results should be a fixed, non-discretionary duty, and control over who appoints election administrators shouldn't shift the moment a different party wins a different office.

The people who count and certify votes should not be chosen, or removable, by whichever party most recently won a different office. That's the whole claim. It says nothing about whether a state's chief election official should be elected or appointed; it says the machinery that certifies who won an election shouldn't be handed to a new operator the moment a different election changes who gets to pick the operator.

North Carolina ran exactly that maneuver. Senate Bill 382, enacted by a party-line veto override in December 2024 (30-19 in the Senate, 72-46 in the House), moved appointment power over the State Board of Elections and every county board chair from the governor to the state auditor, with the administrative transfer to the auditor's office effective July 1, 2025, roughly six months into the same term in which a Democratic governor and a Republican auditor were both sworn in. A trial court called the transfer unconstitutional in April 2025, before the transfer had even taken effect. An appeals court let it take effect anyway while the underlying question is still on appeal in mid-2026, so the auditor has controlled election-board appointments for well over a year with the constitutional question still unresolved.

Georgia tried a related maneuver from the certification side. In 2024, its State Election Board added a rule requiring county officials to conduct a "reasonable inquiry" before certifying results, the same kind of discretion two Cochise County, Arizona supervisors invoked in 2022 to delay certifying a county's

votes past the deadline before a court ordered them to sign. Georgia's Supreme Court, eight of whose nine justices were appointed by a Republican governor, struck the rule down in June 2025 as exceeding the board's statutory authority. The court with the least partisan incentive to rule against a Republican-majority board did it anyway.

Proposals:

1. Codify certification everywhere as a strictly ministerial duty, enforceable by an expedited mandamus remedy available within days, closing the discretion gap Georgia's board tried to open and Cochise County exploited.
2. Require any law reassigning appointment or removal authority over state or local election administrators to take effect only at the start of the next regular election cycle, not immediately, unless passed by a two-thirds majority in each chamber that includes votes from more than one party, or, in Nebraska's unicameral, officially nonpartisan legislature, a two-thirds majority of all members, since there is no second chamber and no formal party affiliation to test against.
3. Favor a fixed, party-balanced, multi-member structure for state election oversight bodies, on Wisconsin's model, over concentrating that authority in one partisan elected officer.
4. Protect election officials who perform their ministerial duties on schedule from retaliatory removal, while preserving accountability for proven fraud or dereliction.
5. Require independent legal and security review, published before adoption, for any new rule that adds discretion to a certification process.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Economy & Innovation

Six issues where only one, the founding plank on revitalizing the economy through technology, traces back to 2024 text. The other five (central bank digital currencies, intellectual property, trade policy, tax policy, and balanced budgets) were identified as gaps in the 2024 platform and researched from scratch, not patched onto the original argument.

ECON-01 — Revitalizing the Economy: Harnessing Technological Innovation for Growth

Modernize the economy through STEM-centered education, expanded R&D investment, and universal high-speed connectivity, building further on the 2009 recovery act and the 2021 infrastructure law.

The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: technology can generate prosperity and jobs without leaving people behind, but only with deliberate investment. Automation and rapid technological change have exposed gaps in skills, opportunity, and prosperity. The COVID-19 pandemic didn't create these gaps but made them undeniable. Past federal responses were well-intentioned but incomplete: the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stabilized the economy after the Great Recession but didn't lay groundwork for future innovation; the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act modernized roads and bridges but didn't go far enough for 21st-century competitiveness.

Proposals (as stated in the source document):

1. Put STEM at the heart of education from elementary school through higher education and workforce development: tangible skills for fields like cybersecurity, AI, and biotech, rather than degrees alone.
2. Substantially increase research and development investment so America leads emerging technologies rather than just participating in the global economy.
3. Bring 21st-century connectivity (high-speed internet and digital infrastructure) to every corner of the country, rural and urban alike, as a necessity rather than a luxury.
4. **(2026 addition)** Lock in the R&D funding floor Congress has already defended on a bipartisan basis: don't let it get re-litigated from scratch by whichever administration holds the executive branch next. This isn't a hypothetical floor: in 2025, a budget proposed cutting NSF by roughly half, NIH by more than 40%, and NASA by nearly a quarter. A Republican-controlled Congress rejected it. NSF's final cut: 3.4%. That's the bipartisan consensus this plank is asking Congress to keep defending. On broadband, favor a technology-neutral build-out (fiber, fixed-wireless, or satellite, whichever gets a

household connected fastest) over a fiber-only mandate, but keep reporting requirements on where the money goes. Speed and accountability aren't in tension.

5. **(2026 addition)** Rebalance the STEM push explicitly toward skilled trades (electricians, HVAC technicians, plumbers) in addition to software and coding. This platform's own AI-11 research documents measured entry-level employment declines specifically in the most AI-exposed occupations, which disproportionately overlap with the entry-level coding roles this proposal has historically emphasized, while the trades face a well-documented labor shortage and are structurally far less exposed to near-term AI displacement. A STEM strategy that doesn't distinguish between these two very different near-term risk profiles would go beyond underselling the trades: it would contradict this platform's own labor-market evidence. This is additive, not a substitution: new trades-training funding alongside existing coding and software investment, without pulling resources out of it. A rebalancing budget proposal that quietly became a cut would be violating this proposal's own explicit terms.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

ECON-02 — Central Bank Digital Currencies: A Retail Ban, a Wholesale Question

Make the retail digital dollar ban permanent once enacted, and let the Federal Reserve keep researching wholesale settlement technology that has nothing to do with individual accounts.

The Innovation Party supports the bipartisan bar on the Federal Reserve opening digital-currency accounts for individual Americans, on track to take effect July 10, 2026, and it should be made permanent rather than left to lapse at the end of 2030. A retail central bank digital currency would place one government institution in a direct, revocable relationship with every dollar in a person's daily spending, a degree of financial visibility no existing U.S. payment instrument concentrates in a single hand. This is a question about individual accounts held directly at the central bank, not a question about how banks settle balances with each other, and Washington's own rhetoric about "CBDCs" collapses the two constantly.

Congress has already answered the individual-account question, and it did so with almost no fight at all. The Senate passed the retail-CBDC ban 85 to 5. The House passed it 358 to 32. A subject both parties' messaging treats as a partisan flashpoint produced a bipartisan landslide in both chambers.

That consensus shouldn't automatically extend to the separate question the ban itself exempts: wholesale settlement between banks and central banks. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is already testing tokenized wholesale settlement through the Bank for International Settlements' Project Agorá. China has built a competing rail, Project mBridge, that by late 2025 was settling trade between

China and Gulf states entirely outside the dollar-clearing system. Sitting out that competition because the technology shares a name with the retail idea Congress just banned would give up ground in dollar settlement infrastructure for no gain to anyone worried about a Fed-run bank account.

Proposals:

1. Convert the retail-CBDC prohibition from a four-year rider on a housing bill into permanent statute.
2. Preserve and reaffirm the wholesale-settlement exemption already written into the ban, so a future bill doesn't erase the distinction by accident.
3. Direct the Federal Reserve to continue wholesale tokenization pilots like Project Agorá, with an annual public report to Congress on dollar-settlement competitiveness.
4. If any future Congress revisits retail CBDC, require it to meet the design standards the Fed's own 2022 policy paper already set: privacy-protected, bank-intermediated, never a direct Fed-to-consumer account.
5. Meet the financial-inclusion case for a retail CBDC with tools built for that purpose directly, low-cost account standards and expanded postal-banking pilots, instead of a central-bank account that the Fed's own research on instant payments suggests wouldn't reach the unbanked anyway.

"Central bank digital currency" is not one policy question. It is two, and they call for different answers.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

ECON-03 — Intellectual Property Revolution: Modernizing Patent Law for the AI Era

Patent law should recognize human-directed AI inventorship, fix AI-era eligibility rules narrowly, and keep patent review open so trolls gain no new leverage over startups.

Patent law was built for individual human inventors filing one application at a time. Two separate fights are testing that design at once: whether AI systems that help conceive an invention change who counts as its inventor, and a bipartisan package of bills in Congress that would reshape who can own and challenge a patent. Neither fight is the one AI-10 already covers. That issue settles whether a creator gets paid when a model trains on copyrighted work. This issue is about patent law's separate machinery: who counts as an inventor, what counts as patentable, and who can challenge a patent that should never have issued.

On inventorship, the law is already settled, and this platform agrees with it. The Federal Circuit ruled in 2022 that only a natural person can be a named inventor, and the Patent Office's November 2025 guidance confirms it, treating an AI system the same as lab equipment or research software: useful, sometimes essential, never itself an inventor. That rule should be written into statute. The guidance

already flipped once in under two years; a future administration could flip it again without a single vote in Congress.

On eligibility, the fight is unresolved. Section 101's decades-old "abstract idea" test has left AI and software applications sitting in the slowest lanes at the Patent Office, part of a backlog that has grown past 800,000 unexamined applications. None of this waited for Congress. In August 2025, the Patent Office told its own examiners to stop rejecting sound AI and software inventions on eligibility grounds unless the evidence supported it. That's the Patent Office fixing its own process before a single reform bill reached a floor vote. The pending Patent Eligibility Restoration Act would go further and rewrite the underlying law, but its current text excludes only an unmodified human gene, leaving a loophole critics warn could swallow the exclusion in practice, since isolating or purifying a gene is a routine, practically trivial step already performed in every genetic test, alongside near-automatic eligibility for "any computer application," reopening problems the courts had already closed. The better fix is the standard the Federal Circuit itself just built: eligibility should turn on a specific, claimed technical improvement, not on whether a claim merely points a known technique at a new dataset.

On enforcement, the same congressional package includes a bill that would limit who can challenge a bad patent to parties already sued or threatened. Non-practicing entities already file the large majority of tech-sector patent lawsuits. Handing them a rule that also disarms the nonprofits and open-source defense groups who currently challenge weak patents before anyone gets sued protects exactly the wrong side of that fight.

Proposals:

1. Codify in statute that only a natural person can be a patent inventor under ordinary conception doctrine, the standard the Patent Office's 2025 guidance now applies by treating an AI system as a tool no different from lab equipment, not the multi-factor test its rescinded 2024 predecessor tried to import from joint-inventorship law.
2. Fix Section 101 for AI and software claims around the Federal Circuit's own technical-improvement standard, instead of the broader rewrite the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act currently proposes.
3. Reject any restriction limiting inter partes review petitions to parties already sued or threatened.
4. Bar duplicate inter partes review petitions that re-litigate grounds already rejected against the same patent, without touching who may file the first challenge.
5. Fund the Patent Office's AI-assisted prior-art search program past its current pilot phase to cut the examination backlog directly.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

ECON-04 — Trade Policy for Tomorrow: Put Tariff Authority Back in Congress

The party would restore Congress's constitutional authority over tariffs and modernize customs and digital-trade rules for the e-commerce era and allied cooperation.

Trade policy just had its central authority question decided and reopened in the same year. In February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not let a president impose tariffs at all. Within hours, the administration reached for a different statute, Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, to reimpose the same 10% global tariff on a different legal basis. That authority expires on its own statutory clock on July 24, 2026, and the administration is already lining up new Section 301 investigations to take its place before the deadline hits. Three legal theories for the same tariff inside eighteen months is not stable trade policy. It is one branch of government improvising around whichever court hasn't ruled yet.

The Innovation Party's position: Congress should hold the tariff authority Article I assigns it, and the "harnessing technology" half of this plank should mean modernizing the machinery of trade enforcement and cooperation, not just adding another chip-export fight to the one AI-07 already covers.

This isn't a proposal starting from zero. Sen. Maria Cantwell has already introduced the Trade Review Act with thirteen cosponsors, seven Republicans including Mitch McConnell and Chuck Grassley alongside six Democrats including Amy Klobuchar and Chris Coons, which does exactly this: let a tariff take effect immediately, then require a congressional vote within 60 days to keep it standing.

Proposals:

1. Enact the Trade Review Act as introduced (S.1272/H.R.2665): any duty on an imported article, not just tariffs imposed under a claimed emergency or balance-of-payments authority, takes effect the day it's proclaimed and lapses automatically unless Congress passes a joint resolution of approval within 60 days, with only antidumping and countervailing duties under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 excluded. That scope already reaches Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs directly, closing the exact Section 122-to-Section 301 substitution the administration is currently attempting without needing a separate carve-out or exception.
2. Pair the now-permanent end of the de minimis exemption with mandatory CBP investment in automated, risk-based screening of low-value imports, so enforcement effort concentrates on the fentanyl-precursor and counterfeit shipments the policy targets instead of taxing every small parcel identically.
3. Resolve digital-trade disputes generally through negotiated frameworks, the model that already produced the June 2026 EU tariff agreement, rather than unilateral tariff threats; the digital-services-tax fight specifically routes through ECON-05's multilateral, OECD-track proposal instead of a

separate bilateral process, so this platform isn't running two different mechanisms for the same dispute. Any measure that specifically targets AI-relevant compute, as January 2026's Section 232 semiconductor tariff did, routes through AI-07's tiered export framework instead.

Congress writing the rule instead of racing the courts costs no time. Under the Trade Review Act, a tariff still starts on day one. What changes is whether it can still be standing a decade later with no vote ever cast on it.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

ECON-05 — Tech-Driven Taxes: Privacy-First Filing, Automation-Neutral Incentives, and a Multilateral Path Out of the Digital Tax Standoff

Modernize federal tax administration around data-minimizing filing, tax-code neutrality between labor and automation, and a multilateral resolution to the digital services tax dispute.

The 2024 platform's "Tech-Driven Taxes" plank was a title with no argument behind it. Filled in now, the starting fact is uncomfortable: federal tax administration still routes a filer's most sensitive financial data through private, advertising-funded companies, the tax code taxes a paycheck far more heavily than the equipment that replaces it, and Washington is fighting other countries' digital taxes one tariff threat at a time instead of replacing them with a single agreed rule.

Start with filing. In 2023, a congressional investigation led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Sen. Ron Wyden found that H&R Block, TaxAct, and TaxSlayer had used Meta's tracking code to send tens of millions of filers' income levels, refund amounts, and dependent information into Facebook's ad-targeting system, sharing the investigators called likely illegal. These are the same companies whose industry spent two decades lobbying to keep a free alternative from reaching taxpayers: Intuit sued and lobbied to kill California's pre-filled ReadyReturn pilot, and in January 2024 the FTC ordered it to stop advertising TurboTax as free when most filers couldn't file for free, though the Fifth Circuit vacated that order in March 2026 on constitutional grounds, sending any further claim to a federal court instead of the FTC's own in-house process. The IRS's own Direct File pilot, built with no advertising business model behind it, earned a 90% positive rating from the taxpayers GAO surveyed, before the Treasury Department shut it down in November 2025, citing cost. The point isn't that a government website is better engineered than commercial software. It's that only a channel with no ad revenue to protect can structurally promise not to sell what it sees, and that promise is what commercial tax software, subsidized or not, has already broken at scale.

Proposals:

1. Restore a free, direct-to-IRS filing option for simple returns, run and audited as a data-minimization system: no third-party ad trackers, no data sale, no exceptions.

2. Apply that same no-third-party-tracker standard to every IRS Authorized e-file Provider, the certification nearly all commercial tax software already holds to transmit returns electronically, not just the smaller set certified through the Free File program, so the privacy floor reaches the paid products most filers actually use and doesn't depend on how many filers switch away from products they already use.
3. Require Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation to publish the effective tax-rate gap between hiring a worker and expensing the equipment that replaces the task, alongside every future bill that expands depreciation or equipment write-offs.
4. Phase in tax-rate neutrality over ten years: reduce the employer-side payroll tax rate each year, funded by narrowing 2025's permanent 100% bonus depreciation and expanded Section 179 cap by an equivalent amount, sized to JCT's own published gap estimate under Proposal 3, so the relative subsidy actually narrows instead of requiring Congress to repeal the 2025 law outright in one vote it won't take.
5. Leave a flat tax on robots or automation off the table. The phase-in in Proposal 4, not a new tax on the machine, is this issue's answer to the roughly 23-point gap between how lightly the tax code treats automation-capable equipment and how heavily it treats a paycheck for the same task.
6. Re-enter multilateral negotiations to replace country-by-country digital services taxes with one formula, instead of the current approach of bilateral tariff threats that fall on unrelated exporters rather than the digital firms the fight is about.

Every proposal here targets one specific place where the tax code or tax administration already picked a side without saying so: advertising-funded filing software, a depreciation schedule that undertaxes machines relative to paychecks, and a tariff-only response to a foreign tax dispute that a shared formula could resolve instead.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

ECON-06 — Balanced Budgets: A Forcing Mechanism, Not a Slogan

Replace the empty demand for a "balanced budget" with a bipartisan, fast-tracked process that forces Congress to vote on spending and revenue changes together.

Gross federal debt passed $39 trillion in mid-2026. The FY2025 deficit was $1.8 trillion on $7.0 trillion in spending against $5.2 trillion in revenue, and CBO's February 2026 baseline puts the FY2026 deficit at $1.9 trillion, 5.8% of GDP, with debt held by the public rising from 101% of GDP this year to 120% by 2036, above the prior record set just after World War II. Net interest on the debt passed $1 trillion for the first time in FY2025 and now costs more than national defense. None of that is in dispute. What Congress cannot agree on is a mechanism, and the two live options on the table this year point in opposite directions.

On March 18, 2026, the House voted 211-207 on Rep. Andy Biggs's constitutional balanced-budget amendment, far short of the two-thirds required. It deserved to fail on the merits, not just the math: the amendment pairs mandatory annual balance with a two-thirds supermajority for any tax increase, which forecloses revenue as a lever by design and would force spending cuts precisely when a recession is already cutting tax collections.

The other live mechanism is the Fiscal Commission Act, introduced this Congress by sponsor Sen. John Curtis (R-UT), with Angus King (I-ME), Thom Tillis, Chris Coons, Todd Young, Tim Kaine, Bill Cassidy, Jeanne Shaheen, Kevin Cramer, and Mark Warner as cosponsors (four Republicans, one independent, four Democrats, plus Curtis), and a House companion from Reps. Bill Huizenga and Scott Peters whose predecessor bill cleared the Budget Committee 22-12 in January 2024, three Democrats joining every Republican present. It would create a 16-member, evenly bipartisan commission charged with a debt-stabilization plan, spending and revenue both explicitly in scope, sent to Congress under an expedited procedure. This platform supports that mechanism because it is built to survive the two ways debt-reduction plans usually die: a two-thirds amendment threshold nothing clears, and death by a hundred separate committee markups that never resolve into one vote.

Proposals:

1. Pass the Fiscal Commission Act, with spending and revenue both explicitly inside the commission's mandate, not pre-exempted by either party before the process starts.
2. Pair the floor vote with a pre-enacted fallback if Congress passes nothing by a fixed deadline: an automatic, evenly split mix of spending cuts and revenue measures, sized to a fixed deficit-reduction target and written into the enabling statute itself (see Extended for why this design, not a BRAC-style approval process, is the right precedent to follow).
3. Oppose constitutional amendments built like H.J.Res.139, which pair mandatory balance with a supermajority requirement on new revenue and would turn ordinary recessions into forced austerity.
4. Restore binding statutory discretionary spending caps to replace the ones that expired after FY2025, requiring any waiver to pass as its own standalone, recorded vote rather than ride through an unrelated must-pass bill, the way the PAYGO Medicare sequester waiver rode through November 2025's shutdown-ending funding bill rather than facing a vote of its own.
5. Require that any debt-stabilization package move spending and revenue changes in the same vote: non-defense discretionary spending, just over $950 billion of $7.0 trillion in FY2025 outlays, is not large enough on its own to close a $1.8 trillion deficit even if eliminated entirely.

Deficits are not a mood problem to be solved with better manners. They are the sum of specific, recorded votes, and a bipartisan Senate list running from Curtis and Tillis to Kaine and Warner already exists for the mechanism that would make the next vote binding.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Technology Infrastructure

Four issues, all drafted fresh from current research rather than the 2024 text, even though every one of them names a topic the 2024 platform had already flagged: remote work, chip manufacturing, satellite internet, quantum computing. The topics didn't change. What changed is that none of the 2024 argument survived into the new version. A full do-over, not an edit.

INFRA-01 — Remote Work: Fix the Federal Rules, Don't Legislate the Office

The federal government shouldn't dictate private employers' remote-work policies, but it should fix its own interstate tax rules and its own telework whiplash.

Remote work isn't one policy question — it's at least two, and they get confused constantly. Whether a *private* company requires in-person attendance is a management decision, properly settled between employers and employees (or their unions), not something Washington should mandate either direction. But two federal-policy problems sit underneath the broader remote-work conversation, and both have been sitting unfixed for over a decade:

1. **The interstate tax patchwork.** A worker who travels or works remotely across state lines can trigger nonresident income-tax filing obligations in every state they touch, with wildly inconsistent thresholds and only patchy reciprocity agreements between states. This has nothing to do with whether remote work is good policy. It's a compliance mess that punishes exactly the kind of labor mobility a modern economy depends on. The fix, the Mobile Workforce Act, already has bipartisan sponsors in the Senate and has simply never gotten a floor vote. Its own champion, Thune, now holds the Majority Leader's gavel. That kind of opening doesn't come along often.
2. **Federal workforce telework policy has become a whiplash problem.** Telework eligibility for federal employees has been set and reversed by executive order, fought over in arbitration on a contract-by-contract basis, and treated as a partisan flag to plant rather than a question with a measurable answer. That's a worse outcome for taxpayers and employees alike than either "always remote" or "always in-person." It's policy by whiplash. It doesn't have to stay that way: Texas's own Republican-led legislature reversed its return-to-office mandate 132-11, once the state's own data showed telework hadn't hurt service and had, if anything, cut turnover. A near-unanimous vote like that is proof this doesn't have to be a partisan fight.

Proposals:

1. Pass a federal Mobile Workforce standard: a uniform threshold (30 days) before a state can tax a nonresident remote or traveling worker, replacing the current patchwork of inconsistent state rules and partial reciprocity agreements.

2. Move federal employee telework eligibility out of pure executive-order territory and into statute, with eligibility tied to measured service-quality and productivity data by agency and role, not blanket ideology in either direction, and insulated from being flipped wholesale by the next administration's first-week executive order.
3. Treat remote work's regional economic effects (workers relocating to smaller cities and rural areas, redistributing spending and tax base) as a rural-development opportunity worth measuring and planning around.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

INFRA-02 — Chip Manufacturing: Grants and Tax Credits, Not Government Equity

Continue federal chip-fabrication support through grants and tax credits, not government equity, and fix the H-1B rules undercutting the workforce these fabs need.

Domestic semiconductor manufacturing is one of the bipartisan success stories in recent industrial policy. It's also, as of 2025-2026, a live test case for how *not* to handle the government's role in funding it. The 2022 CHIPS Act passed with bipartisan support on national-security grounds. By 2026, that bet is paying off. TSMC's Arizona fab is profitable and running ahead of schedule. Intel has crossed a threshold no US fab had reached before, 18-angstrom-class production, live in Chandler. Micron and Samsung are underway too, unevenly: Intel's Ohio site has slipped years, Samsung's Texas site has been delayed. The wager that domestic fabrication could work here again isn't hypothetical anymore.

But 2025 introduced a new and, this issue argues, mistaken mechanism: converting Intel's unpaid CHIPS grants into a roughly 10% federal equity stake in the company. That drew objections from free-market conservatives and consumer advocates on the left for different but converging reasons: dilutive terms for existing shareholders, no shareholder vote, and a precedent where the government becomes a company's part-owner rather than its grant-maker with conditions attached. Separately, a new $100,000 fee on new H-1B visa petitions raises the direct cost of exactly the skilled-engineer pipeline (Taiwanese and other foreign process engineers) that TSMC and Samsung rely on to staff and start up these fabs. That's an immigration policy working against the administration's own onshoring goal.

There's a fourth issue this platform won't pretend doesn't exist: leading-edge fabrication uses enormous volumes of ultra-pure water, and it's being built out fastest in Arizona, a state already absorbing Colorado River cuts. The honest picture is more nuanced than either "chip fabs are draining the desert dry" or "there's nothing to see here": substantial consumption, substantial reclamation investment, and a still-unresolved history of semiconductor manufacturing contaminating groundwater the last time this industry scaled up this fast, in the original Silicon Valley.

Proposals:

1. Continue direct federal support for domestic chip fabrication, which is not a partisan question and shouldn't become one, but structure it as conditional grants and tax credits with public accountability (reporting, workforce, and delivery conditions), not government equity stakes in the recipient company, regardless of which administration proposes the equity model.
2. Carve out an explicit exception (or a fast, predictable national-interest waiver process) from the $100,000 H-1B fee for the specific, narrow category of skilled semiconductor process and equipment engineers needed to bring a CHIPS-funded fab online. The fee currently taxes the same onshoring goal it's nominally unrelated to.
3. Expand federal semiconductor workforce-training funding to meaningfully close the projected ~67,000-worker gap by 2030, and pair any company's CHIPS funding with enforcement of the non-discriminatory domestic-hiring commitments made to get that funding in the first place.
4. Require CHIPS-funded fabs to publish independently audited (not self-reported) water-use and recycling figures, and require environmental-remediation bonding sufficient to cover a large-scale groundwater contamination event before a fab receives federal funding. This proposal learns directly from the fact that the last time this industry scaled up this fast, in the original Silicon Valley, it left behind one of the country's densest concentrations of EPA Superfund sites.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

INFRA-03 — Satellite Internet: A Rural Tool, Not a Single Point of Failure

Satellite internet is a legitimate rural tool, but a $42 billion federal program shouldn't concentrate around one company without conflict-of-interest safeguards, competition, and binding astronomy-harm limits.

The 2025 decision to make the federal BEAD broadband program "technology-neutral," letting satellite and fixed-wireless compete with fiber for the same $42.45 billion pot instead of requiring fiber wherever feasible, was defensible on its own terms: some households are cheaper and faster to connect via satellite than by trenching fiber to a single remote address, and getting people connected sooner matters more than the specific technology used to do it. What happened next is the part worth scrutiny: the rule change happened while Elon Musk, Starlink/SpaceX's CEO, simultaneously held a senior federal role shaping government efficiency and spending policy. The same government he was helping run was deciding how much of a $42 billion subsidy pot his own company would receive. This is a conflict-of-interest structure this issue treats as a problem regardless of the individual or administration involved, not a partisan complaint about one company.

The outcome, as state allocations were finalized through 2026, landed well short of the worst-case predictions (roughly $661 million to Starlink nationally, not the $10-20 billion some early estimates warned of), but the underlying structural questions didn't disappear: should a company whose owner

holds a senior federal policy role be eligible for federal broadband subsidies awarded under rules that same role helped shape? And should critical rural connectivity, an increasingly essential utility, depend so heavily on a single company's satellites, given what happened when Ukraine's military communications became dependent on the same company's commercial terms-of-service decisions?

A fourth question deserves equal weight, not an afterthought: every satellite added to a megaconstellation is a measured cost to ground-based astronomy (bright trails across long-exposure images, and radio emissions leaking into frequency bands reserved for radio telescopes), and current mitigation of that harm is voluntary industry cooperation, not binding law. This platform champions "Research, Innovation, and Collaboration" as a core value; a satellite policy that degrades the instruments of scientific research in the name of a different kind of innovation needs to answer for that tension directly, not treat it as someone else's problem.

Proposals:

1. Support technology-neutral broadband deployment as sound policy on its own terms, since satellite is a legitimate tool for the hardest-to-reach locations, but require a binding recusal and conflict-of-interest framework whenever a company's owner or controlling executive simultaneously holds a federal policymaking role touching that company's market, regardless of which company or administration is involved.
2. Require BEAD and successor programs to maintain multi-vendor competition in satellite allocations as additional providers (Amazon's Leo/Kuiper constellation, and others) become operational, rather than allowing early-mover status to calcify into a de facto single-vendor subsidy.
3. Treat single-company dependency for critical rural connectivity as a national-security and market-structure question, not just a competition question, given the demonstrated precedent of commercial terms-of-service decisions affecting military and civilian communications access during the Ukraine conflict; support redundancy requirements for critical use cases rather than treating one satellite provider as an adequate long-term sole solution.
4. Convert the existing voluntary astronomy-coordination framework (satellite-brightness targets, radio-astronomy-band avoidance, orbital ephemeris publication) into binding FCC license conditions for every satellite operator, not just the handful that have negotiated individual agreements. And oppose the current proposal to exempt satellite operations from environmental review entirely, since that review process is a primary reason operators negotiate mitigation commitments in the first place.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

INFRA-04 — Quantum Computing: Fund the Bipartisan Consensus, Extend the Crypto Migration Beyond Government

Fund the reauthorized National Quantum Initiative at Congress's own proposed level, and extend post-quantum cryptography migration support beyond federal systems to critical infrastructure facing the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat.

Quantum computing policy currently looks like nuclear energy policy: broad bipartisan agreement on the goal (stay ahead of China, don't let America's research lead erode), undercut not by ideological disagreement but by an ordinary, boring budget problem. The agreement is more than rhetoric. The National Quantum Initiative Reauthorization cleared committee unanimously in both the House and Senate, sponsored jointly by a Republican chairman and a Democratic ranking member. The same administration issuing ambitious executive orders on quantum leadership has also proposed the kind of science-agency budget cuts that would undercut the research base those orders depend on, and it's Congress's own appropriators, not a partisan opponent, pushing back.

The other half of this issue is more urgent and less abstract than "who leads in quantum research": a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer, whenever it arrives, could break the encryption protecting essentially all of today's digital infrastructure, and adversaries are already harvesting encrypted data now to decrypt once that capability exists, a documented, not hypothetical, threat pattern. The federal government has set a dated migration timeline for its own systems and contractors. It has not yet done the same for the privately-run critical infrastructure (power grids, financial systems, hospital networks) facing the identical threat on the identical timeline.

Proposals:

1. Fully fund the reauthorized National Quantum Initiative at the level its own bipartisan, bicameral sponsors have proposed, rather than letting it become collateral damage in a separate, unrelated fight over overall science-agency budget levels.
2. Extend the post-quantum cryptography migration mandate, currently binding on federal agencies and their contractors on a dated, phased schedule, into resourced (not merely advisory) support for critical infrastructure operators facing the same "harvest now, decrypt later" threat, on a comparably realistic timeline.
3. Maintain the current bipartisan approach to quantum-specific export controls and outbound investment restrictions toward strategic adversaries, while treating the open question of whether these controls are accelerating adversary self-sufficiency as an empirical question to monitor and adjust for, not a settled success to declare and stop watching.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

Governance & Institutions

Four issues about the machinery that holds power accountable regardless of who's using it. Two trace to 2024 plank titles (congressional technology capacity, a federal cyber force) and were re-researched from scratch. Two have no 2024 origin at all: a presidency statutorily exempt from ordinary conflicts-of-interest law, and an inspector-general removal standard a court found unlawful and declined to enforce. Neither enforcement gap was visible until 2025 and 2026 exposed them.

GOV-01 — Bipartisanship and Compromise: Rebuild Congress's Technology Capacity

Rebuild Congress's independent technology capacity so bipartisan compromise starts from a shared, evidence-based record.

"Bipartisanship and compromise" is too often treated as a mood: be nicer, talk more, split the difference. That is not a technology policy. The practical problem is institutional: Congress keeps facing questions about AI, cybersecurity, privacy, chips, quantum computing, and digital identity with weaker in-house technical capacity than the executive agencies, companies, and advocacy groups trying to shape the outcome.

The old Office of Technology Assessment was Congress's own nonpartisan technology-assessment shop. It was created in the 1970s and effectively closed when Congress stopped funding it in 1995. GAO's Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics team now does important work for Congress, but the broader capacity gap remains visible every time a hearing turns into performative questioning instead of a shared factual record. The House Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress proved the better pattern from 2019 through 2022: equal Republican and Democratic membership, more than 200 bipartisan recommendations, and a successor modernization subcommittee still tracking implementation. That is the model this issue builds on.

Proposals:

1. Create a modern Congressional Technology Assessment Office, governed by an equal-party, bicameral board, producing public option memos on major emerging-technology questions before Congress votes on broad preemption, liability, procurement, or funding bills.
2. Expand GAO STAA and CRS technical support at the same time, with clear lane markers: GAO remains the audit and oversight engine; CRS remains the member-facing research service; the new office focuses on forward-looking technology options and tradeoffs.

3. Fund bipartisan committee technical staff and fellowships for technology-heavy committees, including staff jointly approved by chair and ranking member where a committee chooses that model.
4. Require a public "technology evidence docket" for major tech bills: the problem being solved, the factual assumptions, the tradeoffs, the preemption footprint, and what data would change the bill after enactment.
5. Make congressional data infrastructure part of modernization: bill text, amendments, agency comments, and implementation reports should be machine-readable enough that members, staff, journalists, and the public can audit the evidence trail.

The point is not to make Congress technocratic. Elected officials still decide. The point is to make both parties argue from a shared record before they choose. Bipartisanship that depends on personal goodwill disappears when the room changes. Bipartisanship built into the institution can survive the next hearing cycle.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

GOV-02 — Cyber Force: Build Capacity Without Militarizing the Internet

Build national cyber capacity through CISA, Cyber Command, and a reserve bench, with civil-liberties guardrails before creating a new military service.

"Cyber Force" can mean two different things. One is a serious military-organizational question: whether the United States needs a separate armed service for cyber operations, or whether Cyber Command and the existing services can generate, train, equip, and retain the force they need. The other is a broader public-resilience question: whether the country can protect hospitals, water systems, schools, courts, small businesses, and critical infrastructure when cyber incidents spill outside the military lane. Collapsing those two questions into one slogan is the mistake this issue avoids.

The Innovation Party position: build national cyber capacity first, keep domestic cyber defense civilian-led, and create a measured trigger before standing up a new military service. Cyber Command's force-generation problem is real enough to study seriously. It is not yet proof that Congress should create a new branch before testing the enhanced authorities, workforce reforms, and reserve models already in motion.

The Senate already tested the alternative and found it unresolved: Sen. Gillibrand's amendment to stand up a Cyber Force under the Army came to a vote in the Armed Services Committee in June 2026 and failed by one, 14-13 — four Democrats and ten Republicans against, nine Democrats and four Republicans for. A vote split within both parties, not between them, is not proof the idea is wrong. It is proof the fight will keep recurring on whatever the room looks like that year, unless something better than a floor count settles it.

Proposals:

1. Strengthen CISA's civilian role as national coordinator for critical-infrastructure cyber defense, including harmonized incident reporting under CIRCIA so companies report once into a useful federal system instead of drowning in duplicative mandates.
2. Create a National Cyber Reserve, jointly governed by CISA, the Office of the National Cyber Director, and state partners, able to surge vetted civilian experts to state, local, tribal, territorial, school, hospital, and critical-infrastructure incidents.
3. Require a three-year public readiness test before creating a separate Cyber Force: measured Cyber Mission Force readiness, retention, training consistency, authority gaps, and whether Cyber Command's newer service-like authorities have failed to solve the problem.
4. Expand cyber workforce pipelines through CyberCorps Scholarship for Service, NICE-aligned credentials, apprenticeships, veterans' transitions, and paid public-interest cyber fellowships for state and local governments.
5. Put civil-liberties limits in the statute: domestic cyber defense must not become a backdoor for military surveillance, bulk collection, or federal monitoring of ordinary political activity.

This is a pro-defense position precisely because it refuses a cheap shortcut. A new service may eventually be justified. If it is, Congress should create it with evidence, authorities, budget, personnel design, and domestic guardrails in hand. Until then, the urgent work is to build the bench the country already knows it lacks.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

GOV-03 — Executive Ethics: Divestiture and Emoluments Enforcement for the Presidency

Require presidents and vice presidents to divest conflicting financial interests by statute, and create a statutory enforcement path for the Emoluments Clauses that does not depend on a private lawsuit.

Federal conflict-of-interest law binds nearly every executive branch official except the two who run the branch. 18 U.S.C. § 208 requires officials to step back from any government matter touching their own financial interests. Section 202(c), added by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, expressly excludes the President and Vice President from that duty, along with Members of Congress and federal judges. The Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses were supposed to catch what the statute misses, but no modern emoluments lawsuit against a sitting president has produced a ruling on the merits: courts have dismissed every one for lack of standing or mooted it once the term ended.

The gap is not new, and it does not belong to one party. In May 2025, MGX, an Abu Dhabi state-backed investment fund, agreed to settle a $2 billion investment in Binance using a stablecoin issued by World Liberty Financial, the Trump family's own crypto venture. Five months later, President Trump pardoned Changpeng Zhao, the Binance founder convicted of a Bank Secrecy Act violation as part of a $4.3 billion Justice Department settlement. Binance's chief executive has denied any link between the deal and the pardon, and Senators Warren and Merkley have opened an inquiry into the arrangement. No statute required Trump to divest from World Liberty Financial or recuse from that decision, because none exists. Two decades earlier, Vice President Cheney held deferred compensation from Halliburton while the Pentagon steered the company a no-bid Iraq reconstruction contract; no statute reached that either, for the same reason. Section 202(c) is a blind spot regardless of which administration is standing in it.

The Innovation Party position: extend the qualified-blind-trust-or-divestiture standard that cabinet officials already use to satisfy Section 208 to the presidency and vice presidency, and back the Emoluments Clauses with an enforcement path that does not wait for a private plaintiff to prove personal injury.

Proposals:

1. Require the President and Vice President, starting with the term after enactment, to divest financial interests that pose a conflict or place them in a qualified blind trust meeting the existing 5 U.S.C. § 13104(f) standard: independent trustee, no reporting back to the officeholder, OGE-approved trust terms.
2. Extend that requirement to a spouse or dependent child who holds a controlling stake in a business seeking foreign-government or federal-contract business, and, closing the gap a dependent-child threshold alone would leave, to any adult child who holds a controlling interest in a business bearing the officeholder's name or brand and seeking that same kind of business, regardless of the adult child's dependency status.
3. Create a defined statutory cause of action, held by the Comptroller General, to seek injunctive relief for violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses, so a case can reach a court's merits without a private litigant proving individualized injury.
4. Give the Office of Government Ethics and the Comptroller General civil-penalty authority over late or omitted STOCK Act transaction reports and annual disclosures by the President and Vice President, independent of Justice Department referral.
5. Apply the divestiture mandate prospectively only, starting with the next term; apply the enforcement and penalty provisions on enactment.

A president has to be able to trust a rule was not written about them specifically. The next one has to know it already applies before taking the oath.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

GOV-04 — Inspector General Independence and Whistleblower Protection: Close the Enforcement Gap

Give inspectors general enforceable for-cause removal protection and guarantee whistleblower retaliation claims can still be decided even when the Merit Systems Protection Board loses its quorum.

On January 24, 2025, the White House fired at least 17 inspectors general by email, citing "changing priorities," without the 30 days' notice and case-specific rationale the Inspector General Act has required since a 2022 law Congress passed specifically to prevent exactly this. Eight of the fired IGs sued. In September 2025, a federal judge ruled the firings unlawful, then let them stand, because the law that requires a reason attaches no working penalty for skipping it. The administration could simply refile the paperwork and fire the same people again.

That gap is what this issue addresses. An inspector general's whole job is investigating the officials who can fire them. A removal standard that amounts to giving a reason, any reason, thirty days ahead of time is a courtesy notice, not independence.

The Innovation Party's position: convert the Inspector General Act's removal standard from notice-and-reason to enumerated cause, and guarantee that whistleblower retaliation claims can still be decided even when the boards that hear them lack enough confirmed members for a quorum.

Proposals:

1. Limit IG removal to inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, the same language Congress has used for comparable offices since 1935 (see Extended for the standard's current legal footing). State explicitly that disagreement with an IG's findings or a general loss of confidence does not qualify.
2. Attach a consequence to the 30-day notice window: a removed IG keeps investigative and reporting authority during that period unless a court finds a specific, statutorily recognized emergency, instead of losing the office the moment the notice goes out.
3. Require any investigation open at the time of an inspector general's removal, resignation, or vacancy to transfer automatically to a career deputy inspector general or, absent one, to the Government Accountability Office, so the work survives a change in who holds the title even where the removal itself cannot be stopped.
4. Require GAO to certify, within 30 days of any inspector general removal, whether the administration's stated cause is supported by a documented performance record, and to publish that certification regardless of what it finds.
5. Require the Merit Systems Protection Board to maintain adjudicative capacity by statute, so a vacancy dropping the three-member Board below a quorum cannot again freeze whistleblower

retaliation appeals for years, as happened from 2017 to 2022 and again for most of 2025.

6. Require an automatic acting-Special-Counsel succession at the Office of Special Counsel, activating the moment the Special Counsel is removed or the office's authority is under legal dispute, so its work doesn't freeze while a fight over the top job is litigated (see Extended for why OSC needs a different fix than MSPB's).
7. Restore full Whistleblower Protection Act coverage to civil servants whose job duties include investigating and reporting wrongdoing, closing a gap that currently leaves some of government's own watchdogs less protected than the employees they investigate on behalf of.
8. Require GAO to publish a public tracker of every IG and MSPB leadership removal, vacancy, and time without a quorum; every OSC leadership removal or succession-authority dispute; and, for each removal, the status of any investigation open at the time.

This is not a defense of any individual office-holder. It is a bet that the next president, of either party, should inherit watchdogs built to survive being disliked.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Justice & Rights

One issue, carried forward from 2024's digital-justice plank and substantively rebuilt, covering algorithmic decision-making inside the criminal justice system specifically. Where AI shows up inside courts, policing, and sentencing is handled here, cross-tagged to the relevant AI issues rather than argued twice.

JUS-01 — Digital Justice: Leveraging Technology for a Fair and Effective Criminal Justice System

Replace cash bail with a national pretrial risk-assessment system, reform mandatory-minimum and three-strikes sentencing toward judicial discretion, and make rehabilitation, including technology-based programs, a core pillar of justice policy.

The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: justice must be both fair and forward-thinking, with technology as a tool for making the system smarter and more equitable, not a tool for perpetuating existing bias. The document names the scale of the problem directly: over 2.3 million people incarcerated, the highest imprisonment rate in the world, disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. It attributes that scale to specific policy choices: mandatory minimums, three-strikes laws, and the broader "war on drugs," described as perpetuating cycles of punishment without offering solutions.

Proposals (as stated in the source document):

1. Replace cash bail with a national pretrial risk-assessment system that weighs public safety and flight risk rather than a defendant's financial means.
2. Comprehensive sentencing reform: reduce mandatory minimums, eliminate three-strikes laws, and restore judicial discretion so sentences reflect the specifics of a case rather than rigid formulas.
3. Make rehabilitation a core pillar of the system, including technology-based programs (the source document names virtual-reality therapy and digital job training specifically), aimed at reducing recidivism and enabling reintegration.
4. **(2026 addition)** Build a defined amendment/feedback process into any cash-bail reform from day one, rather than treating it as a one-time legislative act. Illinois already lived this test. It was the first state to fully eliminate cash bail, and in January 2026, after a high-profile violent incident, the reform held: its own architects, including the governor and House speaker, stayed at the table and signaled openness to narrowing amendments rather than tearing the law up. That's not proof the fight is over. It's proof that a reform built to bend survives a real crisis better than one that can only break.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

Constitutional Modernization

Eleven issues, one for the First through Tenth Amendments and one covering the rest, all drafted fresh from 2025-2026 law rather than ported from the 2024 charter's amendment-by-amendment essays. Where a court ruling or a change in institutional reality has moved the ground since 2024, these issues follow the current law, not the platform's own prior text.

CONST-01 — First Amendment: Digital Speech, Platforms, and State Pressure

Protect digital speech by defending platform editorial rights, banning state coercion by proxy, and allowing narrow privacy, safety, election, and national-security rules.

The First Amendment does not disappear online. It also does not become a tool for government to force private platforms to carry speech the state prefers. The right modern line is straightforward: government may speak, warn, criticize, investigate threats, and pass content-neutral laws aimed at real non-speech harms. It may not threaten platforms, vendors, payment processors, or advertisers into suppressing lawful viewpoints.

Current law already points there. The Supreme Court's 2024 platform cases treated feed curation and content moderation as expressive activity in core applications. The Court's 2024 coercion case reaffirmed that officials cannot use private intermediaries to punish disfavored speech. In 2025, the Court upheld the TikTok divest-or-ban law on narrow foreign-control and data-security grounds, not as a general permission slip for platform bans. It also upheld a Texas age-verification law for sites with sexual material harmful to minors, which should not be stretched into a universal ID-to-speak rule for ordinary online discussion.

Proposals:

1. Ban government coercion by proxy. Officials may criticize platforms and share lawful threat information, but may not threaten enforcement, licensing, procurement, funding, antitrust, or other state action to suppress protected speech.
2. Protect platform editorial discretion. States should not impose viewpoint-balancing, must-carry, or neutrality rules that make private platforms carry speech against their editorial judgment.
3. Permit narrow, content-neutral rules for privacy, fraud, foreign-adversary control, election mechanics, nonconsensual intimate imagery, child safety, and transparent paid political advertising when those rules are tailored and reviewable.

4. Prefer disclosure, provenance, authentication, competition, interoperability, and privacy tools over broad content bans. AI-12 and AI-13 own the deepfake-specific rules; this issue owns the constitutional boundary.
5. Require public reporting of recurring government-platform moderation contacts, with security-sensitive exceptions and delayed release where needed, so anti-coercion rules can be audited without exposing active investigations.

This position rejects two easy slogans. "Platforms are the public square" is not enough to justify state-compelled carriage. "Private companies can do whatever they want" is not enough to ignore concentrated platform power. The answer is to regulate power through durable tools that do not require the government to decide which lawful views must be amplified or buried.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-02 — Second Amendment: Modern Arms, Due Process, and Public Safety

Protect the individual right to lawful self-defense while requiring due process, traceability, clear statutes, and evidence-based safety rules for modern firearms.

The Second Amendment should be treated as a constitutional right. That does not mean modern firearms policy has to be frozen in 1791, and it does not mean every safety rule can be justified by invoking public danger in the abstract. The right path is narrower and more durable: respect lawful self-defense, write clear statutes, require due process before disarmament, and regulate commercial channels and traceability where current doctrine leaves room to do so.

The current legal landscape makes stale talking points dangerous. The Court's 2022 ruling on modern gun laws requires new rules to match historical tradition, not just interest balancing. Its 2024 domestic-violence ruling upheld temporary disarmament once a court found a credible threat through a restraining-order process. Its 2024 bump-stock ruling rejected an agency rule as a statutory overreach, meaning Congress has to write clear text for conversion devices and rapid-fire accessories. Its 2025 ghost-gun ruling upheld a federal rule covering readily convertible kits and parts, while regulators still recognize that some privately made firearms remain lawful when made outside the business of manufacturing and detectable under federal law.

Proposals:

1. Affirm the individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, including self-defense, while rejecting the claim that every safety rule is unconstitutional.
2. Tie disarmament to individualized process: judicial findings, notice, prompt hearings, credible-threat standards, fast appeals, record correction, return-of-property rules, and penalties for false

emergency petitions.

3. Regulate commercial firearms channels, weapon-parts kits, unfinished frames and receivers, machinegun conversion devices, and unserialized crime-gun supply through clear statutory text rather than agency improvisation.
4. Require traceability in commercial transfer and dealer disposition without creating a general national registry of ordinary lawful owners.
5. Support voluntary safety technology, storage incentives, training, and procurement pilots only after reliability testing. Do not mandate smart guns across the market.
6. Treat 3D printing and digital files carefully. Regulate conduct, commerce, serialization, detectability, and conversion devices, but do not write careless speech bans on technical information.

This is neither confiscation politics nor a veto over every safety measure. It is a rights- first approach that makes safety law survive the courts because it is specific, historical, procedural, and technically current.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-03 — Third Amendment: Home Autonomy and State Use of Private Infrastructure

Do not turn homes, devices, cameras, routers, or private accounts into government infrastructure without consent, law, compensation, and review.

The Third Amendment is not a magic answer to every digital privacy problem. Courts have barely developed it, and the Supreme Court has never treated phones, routers, smart cameras, or cloud accounts as "houses" under the anti-quartering rule. The platform should not pretend otherwise.

But the principle still matters. A free society should not let government quietly convert private homes and household infrastructure into standing operational assets. The old rule said soldiers cannot be quartered in homes in peacetime without consent. The modern statutory version should say that the state cannot secretly, indefinitely, and uncompensatedly use a person's home devices, cameras, routers, vehicles, batteries, storage, or private accounts to host, relay, store, surveil, or launch government operations.

Proposals:

1. Enact a federal Home Infrastructure Autonomy Act: no nonconsensual government occupation or persistent operational use of residential devices, networks, cameras, storage, vehicles, or accounts without clear statutory authority and individualized judicial authorization where rights are implicated.

2. Ban standing government backdoor portals into consumer camera, smart-home, router, or vehicle networks that bypass warrants, subpoenas, consent, or emergency rules.
3. Permit emergency use only when it is time-limited, logged, minimized, compensated when property or service capacity is used, and followed by notice when notice no longer creates danger.
4. Cover military, National Guard, intelligence, law-enforcement agencies, and contractors acting under government direction.
5. Require transparency for agency contracts that buy access to household device networks or residential data streams, subject to narrow security redactions.

This issue is deliberately not a court-made "digital Third Amendment" claim. It is a legislative modernization built from the home-consent principle and checked by the Fourth Amendment, takings law, privacy law, emergency law, and ordinary warrants.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-04 — Fourth Amendment: Digital Warrants and Data-Broker Surveillance

Require warrants and particularity for digital searches, close data-broker workarounds, and reform US-person queries inside foreign-intelligence surveillance.

The Fourth Amendment has to move with surveillance capacity. Government should not be able to avoid a warrant by buying the same sensitive data from a broker, querying a foreign- intelligence database for a US person's communications, or asking a platform for reverse location searches that identify everyone near a place.

Current law is no longer the stale "third-party doctrine solves everything" story. The Court held years ago that historical cell-site location records can be a search. Its 2026 geofence ruling extended that logic: obtaining a large group's location-history data through a geofence request was also found to be a Fourth Amendment search, with probable-cause and particularity questions left for further proceedings. Commercially available information has also become a government-surveillance shortcut, with official intelligence guidance acknowledging that purchased data can reveal intimate details about people's lives.

Proposals:

1. Require warrants based on probable cause and particularity for geofence requests, reverse-keyword searches, historical location histories, device extractions, persistent identifiers, and other sensitive digital searches involving US persons.
2. Close the data-broker workaround: government should not buy or obtain through contract what it would need a warrant, subpoena, court order, or FISA process to compel directly.

3. Reauthorize or restore Section 702 only with US-person-query reform, including judicial approval or a warrant-equivalent process for searches designed to find Americans' communications, plus emergency exceptions, audits, and reporting.
4. Require minimization, deletion, delayed notice where safe, suppression remedies, and public reporting for digital warrants and bulk-like requests.
5. Preserve genuine emergency, consent, cybersecurity-defense, and foreign-target intelligence authorities, but make them time-limited, logged, reviewable, and narrow.

The point is not to blind investigators or intelligence agencies. It is to stop capability from erasing constitutional architecture. A government that can search everyone first and particularize later has recreated the general warrant in digital form.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-05 — Fifth Amendment: Digital Due Process, Property, and Compelled Access

Modernize due process for automated government decisions, compelled device access, forfeiture, and takings without pretending personal data is already constitutional property.

The Fifth Amendment already supplies the principles: no compelled self-incrimination, no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process, and no taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The modern problem is not absence of text. It is that government now acts through automated systems, digital accounts, seized devices, forfeiture revenue, permit conditions, and tax-sale procedures the old statutes did not anticipate.

The party's position is statutory modernization, not a new constitutional amendment. People should receive notice, explanation, human review, and appeal before high-impact automated government decisions deprive them of benefits, licenses, housing, immigration status, property, or liberty. Courts and legislatures should treat compelled passwords and biometric device unlocks as unsettled and rights-sensitive, then create a clear statutory rule against forcing people to help open their own digital lives. Forfeiture and takings law should return surplus value, require prompt process, and remove revenue incentives.

Proposals:

1. Require due-process safeguards for high-impact automated government decisions: notice, reasons, contestable records, human review, audit logs, appeal rights, and public reporting.
2. Bar compelled passwords, passphrases, and biometric device unlocks unless the government uses immunity or another procedure that protects the privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has not resolved this; statutes should not wait for a split to harden.

3. Reform civil forfeiture by requiring a prompt preliminary retention hearing by statute, a clear nexus to alleged wrongdoing, stronger innocent-owner protections, counsel access where property is essential, and limits on agency retention of forfeiture proceeds.
4. Go beyond the constitutional floor by statute: require an independent appraisal or a minimum-bid threshold before a tax-sale auction, then return everything above what is owed. A depressed auction price should not let government, or a buyer connected to it, capture the gap as a hidden windfall.
5. Apply takings scrutiny to legislatively imposed permit conditions and digital-era exactions. A fee or condition should have a real connection to the public burden it claims to address.
6. Create statutory data rights and damages for misuse without making the overbroad claim that personal data is already a Fifth Amendment property interest in every context.

This issue sits beside CONST-04. The Fourth Amendment issue asks when government can search or seize data. This issue asks what process and compulsion limits apply when government uses digital systems to deprive, extract, retain, or force access.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-06 — Sixth Amendment: Digital Criminal Process, Counsel, and Confrontation

Fund counsel, modern discovery, protect confrontation, and require reliability for forensic and machine evidence instead of weakening trial rights to clear backlogs.

The Sixth Amendment is not a nostalgia clause. It is the operating system for adversarial criminal justice: counsel, confrontation, compulsory process, impartial juries, public trial, and speed. Modern courts can use technology, but they cannot solve backlog by turning trials into paperwork, remote shortcuts, surrogate forensic testimony, or algorithmic evidence no one can meaningfully challenge.

Current law points to a practical modernization agenda. Public defense is load-bearing constitutional infrastructure, and federal courts have reported funding pressure that affects defender services. The Speedy Trial Act exists, but speed cannot come by weakening counsel, confrontation, or juries. Courts have also made clear that a substitute expert cannot simply relay what an absent lab analyst found in that analyst's place: confrontation requires that the person whose work is being used against a defendant be available to answer for it. Evidence rules are moving the same direction for machine-generated evidence. Before a jury hears an algorithm's output, a court should have to find it reliable first, the same screening it already applies to expert witnesses.

Proposals:

1. Fund public defense as constitutional infrastructure: realistic caseload limits, investigative and expert services, digital discovery tools, secure client communication, and pay parity sufficient to keep qualified counsel.
2. Modernize criminal discovery for digital evidence: machine-readable production, chain of custody, lab notes, validation studies, error rates, model or software version history, and access to defense experts under protective orders where needed.
3. Preserve confrontation for forensic and machine-assisted evidence. Defendants cannot "cross-examine the algorithm"; they need disclosure, validation, and a human sponsor or analyst whose claims can be tested.
4. Use remote technology for access, scheduling, interpretation, public observation, and consent-based preliminary matters, but do not normalize routine remote testimony or judge-only criminal trials as backlog relief.
5. Improve jury participation through better summons systems, higher juror compensation, accessibility, childcare pilots, employer protections, and public-trial rules that protect witnesses, jurors, minors, sealed evidence, and safety.

The party's line is simple: faster courts are necessary, but a fast trial without counsel, confrontation, reliable evidence, and a real jury is not speedy justice. It is triage in constitutional language.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-07 — Seventh Amendment: Civil Juries, Arbitration, and Algorithmic Harm

Preserve civil juries by limiting forced arbitration and class waivers, modernizing online courts, and requiring reliable, human-accountable algorithmic evidence.

The Seventh Amendment protects civil juries in federal suits at common law. It does not apply to the states in the same incorporated way most Bill of Rights guarantees do, and it does not create a constitutional right to class actions. The party should be precise about that. The modern policy problem is broader than the constitutional floor: workers, consumers, patients, tenants, small businesses, and users increasingly lose public adjudication through predispute arbitration clauses, class-action waivers, and low-value harms too small to bring one by one.

The answer is statutory and procedural modernization. Congress has already shown it can carve categories out of forced arbitration, as it did for sexual-assault and sexual-harassment disputes. It can do the same for civil-rights, consumer, worker, data, and algorithmic harms where public accountability and aggregation matter. Courts can modernize online access, case management, and evidence rules without converting public adjudication into a private black box.

Proposals:

1. Limit enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses and class-action waivers for civil- rights, consumer, worker, data, health, housing, and algorithmic-harm claims where adhesion contracts erase practical accountability.
2. Preserve court jurisdiction over stayed arbitrable claims and make arbitration outcomes reviewable for statutory categories Congress identifies as public-accountability claims.
3. Modernize civil courts with e-filing, remote access, plain-language notices, online small- claims tools, early case management, and accessibility without making jury access harder.
4. Require Rule 702-style reliability for algorithmic or machine-generated evidence in civil cases, including validation, error rates, version history, human sponsors, and meaningful cross-examination where needed.
5. Preserve jury access carefully where agencies seek punitive civil penalties for claims that resemble traditional common-law suits; that does not mean all agency adjudication is illegitimate.

This position does not treat arbitration as unconstitutional. Arbitration can be useful after a dispute arises, between sophisticated parties, or when people knowingly choose it. The target is forced, predispute, repeat-player arbitration that makes public rights and aggregated low-dollar harms disappear.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-08 — Eighth Amendment: Bail, Fines, Sentencing, and Digital Punishment

Require proof and process for detention, proportional fines and forfeitures, humane prison conditions, and limits on digital punishment that extends custody.

The Eighth Amendment does not abolish cash bail, preventive detention, civil forfeiture, the death penalty, or juvenile life without parole under current federal doctrine. A platform that says otherwise is not being rigorous. The better stance is stronger and more precise: detain dangerous people with proof and process; do not jail poverty; do not fund agencies through punitive forfeiture and fees; do not let prisons become medical neglect zones; and do not turn electronic monitoring into custody without walls.

Current law already supplies the guardrails. Courts allow bail and preventive detention when tied to individualized findings and process. The ban on excessive fines binds state and local governments alongside the federal government. Government does not need a separate hearing before it starts a forfeiture case, though legislatures remain free to require one anyway. After a fairly run tax-sale auction, the owner is currently guaranteed only the sale proceeds above what was owed rather than the

property's full market value, and this issue's takings proposal goes further than that guarantee requires. Courts have declined to read the Eighth Amendment as a broad bar on public-camping enforcement. Separate prison-conditions law still governs medical neglect, overcrowding, and deliberate indifference inside custody.

Proposals:

1. Require individualized findings before pretrial detention, with fast hearings, counsel, evidence access, victim-safety inputs, and audited risk tools where tools are used.
2. Treat fines, fees, forfeitures, and payment plans as punishment when they function that way. Require ability-to-pay review, proportionality, waivers, and no driver's-license or benefit traps for poverty alone.
3. Reform forfeiture and tax-sale windfalls through statutory preliminary hearings, surplus- proceeds return, revenue-conflict limits, and public reporting.
4. Set enforceable prison and jail medical-care, heat, sanitation, mental-health, disability, and overdose-prevention standards, with reporting that courts and the public can inspect.
5. Regulate electronic monitoring, location restrictions, app check-ins, and digital supervision as liberty restraints: time limits, proportionality, privacy limits, fee bans, and appeal paths.
6. Keep death-penalty and juvenile-sentencing policy grounded in current doctrine: protect intellectual-disability and youth safeguards, require reliable process, and do not claim current federal law already categorically abolishes either punishment.

This issue complements JUS-01. JUS-01 owns the affirmative reform agenda for bail, sentencing, and rehabilitation. CONST-08 owns the punishment limits: excess, proportionality, custody conditions, and digital restraints.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-09 — Ninth Amendment: Digital Autonomy, Medical Privacy, and Unenumerated Rights

Protect unenumerated liberty through statutory privacy, medical-data, family-autonomy, and anti-surveillance safeguards without pretending the Ninth Amendment alone restores rights current doctrine has narrowed.

The Ninth Amendment is not a magic password for every right a platform wants. Current federal doctrine is narrower than that. *Dobbs* rejected a federal constitutional abortion right and warned against open-ended substantive due process. *Glucksberg* still shapes how courts ask whether an unenumerated right is deeply rooted. The Ninth Amendment remains a serious constitutional instruction: enumerating some

rights does not mean the people surrendered all others. But the practical policy work now has to be statutory, state-constitutional, and institutional, not just rhetorical.

That matters most where technology makes intimate life legible: reproductive-health records, location trails, period apps, genetic data, family communications, youth records, medical AI, and benefits data. The 2024 federal reproductive-health HIPAA rule tried to create a special privacy shield, but a federal court vacated most of it nationwide in June 2025 and HHS's own public guidance now acknowledges that status. A platform that still talks as if the rule is intact is out of date.

Proposals:

1. Pass a federal medical-privacy statute for reproductive, genetic, mental-health, fertility, gender-related, addiction-treatment, and other intimate health data, with private-sector limits, government-access process, and cross-state disclosure rules.
2. Protect lawful out-of-state medical care from dragnet data requests by requiring warrants, particularity, notice where safe, minimization, and a private right to challenge overbroad demands.
3. Let states strengthen liberty through state constitutional privacy, reproductive-freedom, family-autonomy, and data-rights provisions, while setting a federal floor against interstate surveillance and data-broker circumvention.
4. Require privacy-by-design for health, benefits, education, and family-service systems: data minimization, deletion rights, access logs, purpose limits, and no secondary sale of sensitive records.
5. Keep the constitutional claim precise. The party should defend unenumerated liberty as a principle of constitutional interpretation while building enforceable statutes that do not depend on courts rediscovering *Roe* under a different label.

The point is not to relitigate every culture-war issue inside one amendment. It is to say that a free society cannot let intimate life become a data exhaust stream for prosecutors, employers, insurers, platforms, or abusive partners.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-10 — Tenth Amendment: Federalism, Preemption, and State Technology Capacity

Let states experiment on AI, privacy, cyber, and digital services while using federal floors, interoperability, and preemption only where fragmentation breaks rights.

The Tenth Amendment should not be reduced to "states can do whatever they want" or "federal law should wipe out state experiments." Modern technology policy needs both national scale and state learning. AI discrimination, privacy, child safety, cyber incident response, health data, elections, public

benefits, and digital public infrastructure all cross borders. They also touch local institutions that states run.

Current doctrine gives a workable frame. *Murphy*, *Printz*, and *New York v. United States* bar federal commandeering of state legislatures and officers. *Reno v. Condon* shows that Congress can regulate states as data holders through generally applicable rules. *National Pork Producers* narrowed some extraterritorial Dormant Commerce Clause theories, while preemption still blocks state laws that conflict with federal statutes or valid national standards. Colorado's 2024 AI law and 2026 rewrite show the upside and cost of state experimentation: states can move first, learn publicly, and correct burdens before Congress acts.

Proposals:

1. Use federal floors, not ceilings, for privacy, AI discrimination, cybersecurity, health data, and digital public infrastructure unless Congress makes a clear, evidence-based preemption choice.
2. Preserve state experimentation through safe harbors, model laws, interstate compacts, federal technical assistance, shared testing infrastructure, and grant conditions that do not commandeer state officials.
3. Preempt only where fragmentation defeats the right or function: interoperability, cross-state data transfer, national cyber reporting, accessibility, identity credentials, election-system security baselines, and consumer notice formats.
4. Require federal agencies to publish preemption analyses before displacing state technology laws, including effects on civil rights, small businesses, state capacity, and open-source or public-interest alternatives.
5. Keep grant conditions clear, related, and noncoercive, so federal funding supports state capacity without becoming backdoor commandeering.
6. Build state capacity directly: procurement templates, audit labs, public-interest technologists, cyber mutual aid, privacy engineering, and shared evaluation tools.

The party's stance is federalist but not nostalgic. A country-sized network needs national minimums and common rails. It also needs states that can test rules before Congress gets them right.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

CONST-11 — Other Amendments: Civil Rights, Continuity, and Constitutional Maintenance

Use later amendments as guardrails for civil rights, voting, prison labor, state accountability, succession, congressional pay, and amendment realism.

The rest of the Constitution is not a museum annex after the first ten amendments. The Reconstruction Amendments, voting amendments, succession amendments, and Article V rules all matter in a technology platform. They decide whether algorithmic government treats people as equal citizens, whether voting systems are accessible and non-discriminatory, whether prison labor and court debt are governed honestly, whether state governments can be held accountable through remedies that work, whether presidential incapacity and succession are clear, whether congressional pay changes obey the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, and when a constitutional amendment is worth pursuing at all.

Current reality is demanding. *Students for Fair Admissions* tightened federal equal- protection rules around race-conscious government action. *Alexander* made racial- gerrymandering claims harder where race and partisanship overlap. *Louisiana v. Callais* held in April 2026 that Louisiana's additional majority-minority district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because the Voting Rights Act did not require it. *Trump v. Anderson* held that states cannot enforce Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment against federal candidates without congressional legislation. These cases do not make equality or voting rights optional. They make evidence, statutory design, and constitutional footing more important.

Proposals:

1. Require algorithmic equal-protection audits for public systems that affect benefits, policing, housing, education, voting access, health care, immigration, or public employment, with disparate-impact evidence, validation, appeal rights, and procurement consequences. Do not claim disparate impact is automatically unconstitutional.
2. Protect voting rights through accessible election technology, auditable paper trails, language access, anti-poll-tax enforcement, youth-voter access, disability access, and evidence systems capable of surviving current racial-gerrymandering doctrine.
3. Design state-accountability remedies around current sovereign-immunity doctrine: prospective relief, federal enforcement, Spending Clause and procurement conditions, waiver rules, public disclosure, and clear Section 5 abrogation where Congress has the record to justify it.
4. Modernize prison-labor and court-debt policy under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: no coerced labor for private profit, wage and safety standards, transparent contracts, and no debt traps that function like civic exclusion.
5. Strengthen continuity and succession rules: public medical-disability procedures for high office, cyber-resilient electoral-count infrastructure, and statutory triggers that do not require a constitutional crisis before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is usable.
6. Fund congressional capacity, technical staff, and security without disguising member pay raises; any member-compensation change has to respect the Twenty-Seventh Amendment's intervening-election rule.

7. Use Article V sparingly. Pursue constitutional amendments only where current text or doctrine blocks the policy and where statutory, state-constitutional, or institutional routes cannot do the work.

The party should sound constitutionally serious: use equal citizenship as a governing standard, not as a vibe; use amendments when they are necessary, not as press releases.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Health & Bioscience

Two issues, both researched fresh: life-extension research (reframed around healthspan, clinical trials, and anti-fraud standards, not longevity marketing) and a broader healthcare issue covering access, interoperability, telehealth, workforce capacity, and accountable use of AI in care.

HEALTH-01 — Life Extension Research: Healthspan, Not Immortality Marketing

Fund aging biology for longer healthy life, with rigorous trials, usable biomarkers, and enforcement against unsupported anti-aging claims.

The old title, "Life Extension Research," points at a real field but the wrong promise. The defensible public goal is healthspan: more years with preserved function, fewer years lost to frailty, disability, chronic disease, and dependence. The National Institute on Aging exists to study aging and extend healthy, active years of life. ARPA-H's PROSPR program is already aimed at the practical bottleneck: biomarkers, intrinsic-capacity measures, and clinical trial protocols that can test age-related functional outcomes in years rather than waiting decades for lifespan results.

That is a serious research agenda. It is not permission to launder anti-aging clinics, supplement claims, stem-cell marketing, plasma hype, or genetic shortcuts into public policy. FDA and FTC evidence standards matter more here, not less, because older adults and families facing decline are easy targets for expensive false hope.

Proposals:

1. Fund NIH, NIA, and ARPA-H work on geroscience, healthspan biomarkers, intrinsic-capacity measures, age-related disease mechanisms, and trial designs that can test preserved function in realistic time frames.
2. Support public data infrastructure for longitudinal aging research, with consent, privacy, cybersecurity, and data-access rules aligned with PRIV-01 rather than a blank permission slip for commercial health-data extraction.
3. Keep FDA's approval standard and FTC's advertising standard intact. A product marketed to treat age-related loss of function should prove it like a health product, not hide behind wellness language.
4. Require federally funded healthspan trials to measure functional outcomes that matter: mobility, cognition, immune function, resilience, frailty, independence, and adverse events, not just omics proxies that look impressive in a pitch deck.

5. Build access into the research plan early. If a healthspan intervention works, public policy should not let it become a longevity luxury good available only to wealthy early adopters.

The party should be ambitious here because aging biology is real science. It should also be disciplined because this is exactly the field where ambition turns into grift when evidence is treated as optional.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

HEALTH-02 — Revolutionizing Healthcare: Access, Interoperability, and Accountable AI

Guarantee practical access, cut administrative waste, make health data portable, and deploy telehealth and AI only when they improve measurable care.

"Revolutionizing healthcare" should not mean a slogan with no delivery mechanism. The United States spent $5.3 trillion on health care in 2024, 18.0 percent of GDP, while CDC's latest FastStats still counted 28.0 million people under 65 uninsured in 2025. A system can be expensive, innovative, and still fail patients if coverage, records, prior authorization, workforce, and prices do not work at the point of care.

The current reality gives the party a better frame than the 2024 source material. CMS has a prior authorization and interoperability rule with 2026 and 2027 deadlines. TEFCA is becoming a national network-of-networks for health information exchange. Medicare telehealth flexibilities are extended through December 31, 2027. Hospital price transparency has moved from broad posting requirements to more standardized machine-readable files and 2026 enforcement. HHS is pushing AI across health care and agency operations, while its own AI strategy recognizes governance, risk management, privacy, and public trust as requirements.

Proposals:

1. Treat universal practical access as the goal: every person should be able to get primary, behavioral, emergency, reproductive, preventive, and chronic care without insurance status or geography making care unusable.
2. Enforce interoperable health data. CMS's API deadlines, TEFCA exchange, information blocking rules, and patient access rights should be measured by whether patients and clinicians can actually use records across systems.
3. Cut administrative waste with enforceable prior authorization timelines, electronic requests, denial transparency, appeal rights, and audit penalties for automated denials that do not meet clinical standards.
4. Keep telehealth where it improves access, including rural and behavioral health, while measuring quality, fraud, continuity, and patient outcomes rather than treating video visits as automatically

better or worse.

5. Use AI as clinical and administrative assistance, not hidden authority. High-impact health AI should require pre-deployment testing, impact assessment, independent review, monitoring, appeal paths, and clear liability.
6. Build workforce capacity through primary care, nursing, behavioral health, rural practice, residency slots, loan repayment, and scopes of practice tied to training and safety.

The party does not need to pick the least-detailed version of left or right health policy. It can make the operational claim: care should be available, records should move, prices should be usable, denials should be accountable, and technology should earn its place by improving outcomes.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Energy & Environment

Three issues: nuclear energy carried forward from 2024 and substantively rebuilt, climate policy and fusion energy researched fresh. All three sit on the same premise: the technology and the climate problem move faster than a platform gets rewritten, so this domain gets revisited on its own schedule between platform cycles, whenever the evidence moves.

ENV-01 — Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Powering America's Carbon-Free Future

Invest in advanced reactor research and streamline approval of new nuclear designs as a carbon-free complement to renewables.

The party's position, migrated faithfully from the 2024 platform: nuclear power is a critical pillar of a carbon-free energy strategy alongside renewables, not a competitor to them. The document leans on a specific historical and technical case: decades of safe US Navy nuclear propulsion, stricter safety protocols adopted industry-wide after Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, and a waste-volume comparison against coal (nuclear waste accumulated over sixty years, it claims, could fit on a football field stacked a few meters high). It also makes an explicit nonproliferation argument: civilian reactors require only 3–5% uranium enrichment versus roughly 90% for weapons-grade material, a difference it treats as evidence that civilian nuclear power and weapons proliferation are not the same policy question.

Proposals (as stated in the source document):

1. Robust investment in advanced reactor research, specifically small modular reactors (SMRs) and Generation IV designs, prioritized for their passive safety features and efficiency.
2. Streamlined regulatory approval processes for advanced reactor designs: the document frames current regulation as needlessly slow, not as insufficiently safe, while maintaining stringent safety standards.
3. Workforce development: federal, state, and private-industry collaboration on training programs for the next generation of nuclear professionals.
4. **(2026 addition)** Restore the community and tribal cleanup funding for legacy uranium mining contamination, including on Navajo Nation land, that got stripped from the 2024 federal nuclear-streamlining law during passage. That law passed the Senate 88-2 and the House 393-13. Only two senators voted no, and both named this same funding cut as their reason. Near-unanimous

agreement on nuclear power itself, undone by one fixable flaw. That flaw deserves an answer, and Proposal 4 is that answer, rather than a reason to dismiss the objection as anti-nuclear obstruction.

5. **(2026 addition)** Be honest that waste-storage siting remains a live, unresolved local political problem, not a solved one. Governors of both parties have opposed interim storage sites in their own states even after the Supreme Court cleared federal authority to proceed. A durable plan needs to address that resistance directly, not rest on the waste-volume comparison alone.
6. **(2026 addition)** Say plainly what nuclear's long buildout timeline means for right now: AI data centers are the confirmed driver of surging electricity demand this plank anticipated, but that demand is being met today mostly with gas and diesel generation, not nuclear. In at least one documented case, unpermitted turbines were sited next to a low-income, majority-Black community, and measured price increases are already hitting ordinary ratepayers. Support enforcement of existing environmental-permitting law against companies routing around it to meet AI compute demand, rather than letting a "the nuclear answer is coming" argument excuse what's happening in the meantime.

Last reviewed Jul 4, 2026

ENV-02 — Climate Challenge: Deployment, Adaptation, and Honest Accounting

Cut emissions with deployable clean power and enforceable accounting while adapting communities to heat, fire, flood, and grid stress already here.

The climate challenge is no longer a future-tense values plank. The facts are current: WMO says 2015-2025 were the hottest 11 years on record and 2025 was roughly 1.44 C above the 1850-1900 average. IPCC's core finding remains unchanged: human-caused warming is unequivocal, every increment of warming raises risk, and deep, rapid, sustained emissions cuts are required. The United States has also changed its policy footing since 2024. The 2025 budget law accelerated the termination of multiple clean-energy and vehicle credits, while electricity demand is rising again after years of flat load, with data centers a major driver.

The Innovation Party's position is practical: climate policy should be judged by tons cut, resilience built, grid capacity added, and public accounting that survives a change in administration. It should not be judged by the size of a slogan or the purity of one technology camp. The platform supports abundant clean energy, faster permitting for transmission and generation, strict pollution accounting, methane and industrial emissions controls, data-center cost responsibility, and adaptation for communities already living with heat, fire, flood, drought, and smoke.

Proposals:

1. Rebuild a stable clean-deployment policy after the 2025 credit rollbacks: technology-neutral incentives or standards should reward verified low-carbon power, storage, transmission, geothermal, advanced nuclear, carbon-free industrial heat, and demand flexibility.
2. Make transmission, interconnection, storage, and grid-enhancing technologies a climate priority. Clean generation that cannot connect to the grid is a press release, not a climate policy.
3. Require large data centers and other new large loads to pay for the grid upgrades and clean firm supply they require, with transparent emissions accounting and no backdoor shift of costs onto residential ratepayers.
4. Keep methane, vehicle, building, industrial, and power-sector emissions in the policy frame. Climate strategy cannot rely only on the electricity sector while leaving the rest of the economy to drift.
5. Fund climate adaptation as core infrastructure: heat plans, wildfire smoke protection, flood control, water resilience, grid hardening, insurance transparency, and local hazard data. Mitigation is necessary; adaptation is already overdue.
6. Protect federal climate and emissions data from political interference. Inventory, weather, disaster, and grid data should remain public, continuous, and methodologically stable enough for states, insurers, utilities, farmers, and businesses to plan.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

ENV-03 — Fusion Energy: Fund the Hard Parts, Do Not Promise the Shortcut

Back fusion as a strategic energy bet, but fund materials, tritium, regulation, and supply chains before promising cheap power.

Fusion energy belongs in the platform, but not as a magic sentence that solves climate, data centers, or energy abundance on a campaign timeline. The current facts are better than the old skepticism allowed and less mature than the hype implies. Lawrence Livermore's National Ignition Facility has repeatedly achieved ignition since December 2022, with an April 2025 shot producing 8.6 megajoules from 2.08 megajoules delivered to the target. That is a scientific milestone. It is not a commercial power plant.

The Department of Energy's 2025 Fusion Science and Technology Roadmap is the right kind of document because it names the hard parts: fusion materials, plasma-facing components, blanket and tritium fuel-cycle systems, supply chains, workforce, public-private partnerships, and commercialization milestones. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is also building a proportional framework that treats near-term fusion machines under a byproduct materials approach rather than copying the fission-reactor model. That is the right posture: move faster than fission regulation where the hazards justify it, but do not pretend fusion has no safety, waste, tritium, neutron-activation, or nonproliferation questions.

Proposals:

1. Fund fusion as a strategic public-private research and demonstration program, not as a replacement for today's clean-energy deployment. Fusion should complement climate policy, not delay it.
2. Prioritize the bottlenecks DOE identifies: fusion-relevant materials testing, tritium breeding and accountancy, plasma-facing components, heat exhaust, simulation, component lifetime, and supply chains.
3. Use milestone-based public-private partnerships. Public money should buy learning, shared test infrastructure, open technical data where possible, and measurable risk reduction, not unbounded rescue of any single company's schedule.
4. Support NRC's proportional fusion regulatory framework while requiring worker, public, waste, tritium, environmental, and security protections appropriate to each design.
5. Preserve international science collaboration, including ITER lessons, while building domestic supply chains and workforce capacity for magnets, lasers, materials, tritium systems, controls, power conversion, and nuclear-grade construction.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Space & Frontier

One issue, researched fresh, covering public science, commercial space services, and orbital stewardship together rather than treating "space" as a single applause line, which is what it was in 2024.

SPACE-01 — Space Exploration and Innovation: Public Science, Commercial Services, Usable Orbits

Fund space exploration as public science and infrastructure, buy commercial services where competition exists, and make orbital safety a condition of growth.

Space policy does not need another speech about destiny. It needs a governing rule for a moment when the United States has a working Artemis program, a fast-growing commercial launch sector, a crowded orbital environment, and a NASA budget debate that increasingly protects human exploration by squeezing science and technology underneath it.

The party's position is straightforward: keep the United States leading in space, but define leadership by usable public capacity, not by flags, slogans, or a single contractor's launch cadence. Artemis II's successful April 2026 lunar flyby proved the human-exploration program is no longer just paper architecture. The right answer is not to walk away from Artemis. The right answer is to make the next phase disciplined: keep public science funded, use commercial services where competition and fixed milestones can lower cost, and keep the orbital environment usable for everyone else.

That means resisting two bad habits at once. One is nostalgia procurement: preserving an old architecture because jobs and sunk costs make it politically easier than changing course. The other is commercial fatalism: assuming that whatever private space companies can build should automatically become public policy. NASA should buy transportation, lunar delivery, commercial low-Earth-orbit destinations, communications, and other services when there is a competitive market, clear safety oversight, open interfaces, and a public mission still being served. It should not turn public exploration into a blank check for any vendor that promises speed.

Proposals:

1. Preserve a balanced NASA portfolio: fund Artemis and Moon-to-Mars work, but reject budget plans that pay for human exploration by cutting NASA science, space technology, planetary defense, and Earth-observation capacity below the level needed to keep the public mission credible.
2. Use commercial procurement where the service can be specified and competed: low-Earth-orbit destinations, cargo and crew transport, lunar payload delivery, communications services, and later

deep-space infrastructure. Require fixed milestones, multiple vendors where possible, open technical interfaces, and transparent cost and schedule reporting.

3. Treat space traffic coordination and orbital debris mitigation as infrastructure, not paperwork. Fund and expand TraCSS, require timely operator data sharing, and convert debris and disposal standards into enforceable conditions across federal procurement and commercial licensing.
4. Make international norms part of exploration policy. Keep expanding the Artemis Accords, including open scientific data, registration, emergency assistance, space-resource use under the Outer Space Treaty, and temporary safety zones that avoid becoming land claims.
5. Keep high-value science alive when legacy programs fail. Mars sample return, large observatories, and planetary defense should be competed, re-scoped, or phased when costs overrun, not silently abandoned or funded through wishful accounting.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Global Affairs

Two issues, both researched fresh: immigration (lawful pathways, adjudication capacity, worker protection, and due process) and global connectedness (open networks, digital public infrastructure, and partner-country capacity). Both replace 2024 planks that named the same general territory without a specific mechanism attached.

GLOBAL-01 — Immigration: Lawful Pathways, Fast Decisions, and Worker Protection

Build an immigration system with lawful pathways, fast adjudication, worker protections, and border enforcement tied to due process and labor-market needs.

Immigration policy should start from reality. The country needs order at the border, lawful pathways people can actually use, fast asylum and visa decisions, credible enforcement, and worker protections that prevent exploitation. It also needs to admit that migration is part of demographic and economic capacity. The Census Bureau reported that net international migration fell from 2.7 million in 2024 to 1.3 million in 2025, with population growth slowing to 0.5 percent. BLS reported that foreign-born workers were 19.1 percent of the U.S. civilian labor force in 2025 and had a higher labor-force participation rate than the native-born population.

The current system fails both sides of the argument. A person with a valid asylum claim can wait years. A family or employer can face a maze of caps and per-country limits. A worker can be tied to an employer in ways that invite abuse. A border community can carry costs created by federal backlogs. A blunt $100,000 payment requirement for new H-1B petitions filed after September 21, 2025 may punish small firms and startups more than abusive outsourcing.

Proposals:

1. Modernize adjudication: more immigration judges, asylum officers, interpreters, digital filing, counsel-access pilots, case triage, and legally sound expedited decisions for clearly eligible or clearly ineligible claims.
2. Expand lawful pathways in the labor market: high-skill, entrepreneur, health care, agriculture, construction, caregiving, seasonal, and shortage-area visas tied to wage floors, portability, and enforcement against abuse.
3. Replace blunt visa barriers with targeted anti-abuse rules. For H-1B and similar programs, prioritize wage quality, employer compliance, portability, startup access, and enforcement rather than a flat fee that screens for cash more than merit.

4. Protect immigrant and native-born workers together through wage enforcement, anti- retaliation rules, recruitment standards, and penalties for employers who use immigration status to undercut labor law.
5. Pair border enforcement with due process: identify security threats, discourage repeat unlawful crossing, and process claims fast enough that release, detention, and removal are not substitutes for decisions.
6. Give states and localities surge support when federal immigration policy creates school, shelter, health, or border-service costs.

The party should reject two false choices: open-ended chaos or arbitrary closure. A serious system is lawful, fast, humane, economically literate, and enforceable.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

GLOBAL-02 — Global Connectedness: Open Networks, Standards, and Digital Capacity

Use digital diplomacy to keep networks open, secure, interoperable, and rights-respecting while helping partners build capacity instead of dependency.

Global connectedness should not be written as naive faith that technology automatically creates peace. Networks can carry research, trade, remittances, education, telemedicine, and democratic speech. They can also carry surveillance, cyberattacks, coercion, shutdowns, disinformation, dependency, and fragile supply chains. The current policy question is how to build connection that is open enough to create opportunity and secure enough to survive pressure.

The world is more connected than ever and still deeply divided. ITU's 2025 Facts and Figures report says almost three-quarters of the world's population is online, while 2.2 billion people remain offline, mostly in low- and middle-income countries. The OECD AI Principles were updated in 2024 for a world of generative AI, information integrity, privacy, and interoperability. G7 digital ministers have been coordinating on cross-border data-flow rules, shared AI governance, technical standards, secure networks, undersea cable resilience, and digital public-sector AI.

Proposals:

1. Make open, interoperable, secure internet access a standing diplomatic objective, including opposition to shutdowns, censorship, coercive surveillance exports, and forced data localization that exists mainly to control people.
2. Work through allied and multistakeholder standards bodies on AI, cybersecurity, digital identity, post-quantum cryptography, privacy-preserving data exchange, satellite connectivity, and undersea cable resilience.

3. Support digital public infrastructure abroad only with safeguards: privacy law, cybersecurity, open standards, procurement transparency, user control, and local capacity.
4. Help partners build connectivity, compute, data, and skills capacity so AI and digital services do not deepen dependency on a handful of foreign platforms or governments.
5. Keep trade mechanics in ECON-04 and ECON-05, and compute export controls in AI-07. This issue owns the diplomatic and infrastructure layer: standards, networks, capacity, rights, and resilience.
6. Treat scientific and educational exchange, talent mobility, and research networks as strategic connectedness, paired with security screening where risk is real.

The party's stance is neither techno-utopian nor isolationist. Connected systems need rules, redundancy, rights, and trustworthy institutions. Without those, connection becomes another surface for control.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Rural & Regional

One issue, researched fresh, covering capacity, connectivity, and essential services in rural communities specifically, not a rural gloss on policies designed around cities first.

RURAL-01 — Revitalizing Rural America: Capacity, Connectivity, and Essential Services

Build rural capacity around broadband that gets used, hospitals that stay open, and local institutions able to compete for growth.

The 2024 title "Revitalizing Rural America" is directionally right, but the old rescue frame is too blunt for current reality. Rural America is not simply shrinking. USDA's 2025 Rural America at a Glance report found that nonmetro population increased each year from 2020 to 2024, driven by positive net migration, and that 67 percent of nonmetro counties had positive net migration from 2023 to 2024. Some rural places are gaining people. Some are losing institutions. Some are recreation economies with housing pressure. Some are farm, manufacturing, mining, or service economies facing completely different constraints. A grounded rural policy has to start there.

The Innovation Party's position is that rural development should be treated as a capacity problem, not a nostalgia problem. Connectivity matters, but broadband alone does not build a local economy. A hospital matters, but a hospital cannot survive on speeches about community values if its payer mix, staffing pipeline, and capital budget do not work. Precision agriculture can raise productivity, but only if the farm, the field, the school, the clinic, and the small business can connect, hire, and maintain the systems.

Proposals:

1. Make rural broadband funding outcome-based: prioritize unserved and underserved locations, require public maps and milestone reporting, allow fiber, fixed wireless, and satellite where each is the best fit, and measure adoption and reliability instead of miles built alone.
2. Treat rural hospitals and clinics as essential infrastructure. Expand targeted capital support for facilities that preserve emergency, inpatient, obstetric, mental-health, or telehealth access, and require realistic service-area planning before a closure becomes irreversible.
3. Fund local grant-writing, engineering, and procurement capacity so small counties and towns can compete for federal programs without hiring the same consultants as everyone else or leaving money on the table.
4. Support precision agriculture, rural entrepreneurship, remote work, and small manufacturing through broadband, community colleges, extension services, and shared technical assistance instead of

one-off demonstration projects.

5. Track rural outcomes at the county and regional level: migration, poverty, hospital access, broadband adoption, childcare, workforce participation, and debt stress. A rural policy that reports only national averages will miss the places where the policy failed.

Last reviewed Jul 5, 2026

Closing

We built this platform because we think government can work better, and because we were willing to do the work of proving it instead of just saying it. Fifty-five issues, each sourced, each argued against its own best counterargument, each tied to a chapter network that turns a position into action on the ground.

That's the standard we're holding: a plank isn't done when it's written, it's done when someone can act on it. If you read something here you agree with, the next step is the same one every issue in this document points to: find your chapter, and help make it real. If you read something you'd argue with, say so, on the record, attached to the specific claim, the same way we expect our own researchers to back up theirs.

Innovation over inertia was never a slogan. This document is what it looks like as a body of work.

Appendix A: 2024 Plank Migration Map

Every plank from the source PDF, mapped to where it lives now. `migrated` means the source PDF's actual plank text was ported into the new per-issue file format as the starting point. All seven have since been substantively revised with independent 2025-2026 research — new proposals, Steelman and Who Bears the Cost sections, updated Party Comparisons — and their frontmatter now reads `verification_status: ai-researched-unverified` to reflect that, not `source-migrated`; `migrated` in the table below describes where each issue *started*, not its current trust level. `pending` means it isn't ported yet at all (title only, tracked here so nothing gets lost).

2024 plank title	New domain/ID	Status
Revitalizing the Economy	ECON-01	**migrated**
Digital Privacy Rights: A Framework of Accountability	PRIV-01	**migrated**
Bipartisanship and Compromise	GOV-01	**drafted** *(fresh research; congressional technology capacity, not a 2024 port)*
Remote Work	INFRA-01	**drafted** *(fresh research, not a 2024 port)*
Digital Justice	JUS-01	**migrated**
Chip Manufacturing	INFRA-02	**drafted** *(fresh research; cross-tag AI-07)*
Autonomous Vehicles	—	**merged into AI-04**
Space Exploration and Innovation	SPACE-01	**drafted** *(fresh research; public science, commercial services, and orbital stewardship, not a 2024 port)*
Satellite Internet	INFRA-03	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Central Bank Digital Currencies	ECON-02	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Revitalizing Rural America	RURAL-01	**drafted** *(fresh research; capacity, connectivity, and essential services, not a 2024 port)*
Artificial Intelligence (single 2024 plank)	—	**superseded — see the 13 AI-xx issues above**
Nuclear Energy Renaissance	ENV-01	**migrated**
Life Extension Research	HEALTH-01	**drafted** *(fresh research; healthspan, trials, and anti-fraud standards, not immortality marketing)*
Automation: Embracing Change	—	**merged into AI-11**
Algorithmic Redistricting	DEM-01	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Cyber Force	GOV-02	**drafted** *(fresh research; cross-tag AI-08)*
Blockchain IDs	PRIV-02	**migrated (light — Abbreviated only)**

2024 plank title	New domain/ID	Status
Blockchain Voting	DEM-02	**migrated**
Campaign Financing Reform	DEM-03	**migrated**
Quantum Computing	INFRA-04	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Climate Challenge	ENV-02	**drafted** *(fresh research; deployment, adaptation, and emissions accounting, not a 2024 port)*
Revolutionizing Healthcare	HEALTH-02	**drafted** *(fresh research; access, interoperability, telehealth, workforce, and accountable AI)*
Intellectual Property Revolution	ECON-03	**drafted** *(fresh research; cross-tag AI-10)*
Fusion Energy	ENV-03	**drafted** *(fresh research; hard technical bottlenecks and proportional regulation, not a 2024 port)*
Trade Policy for Tomorrow	ECON-04	**drafted** *(fresh research; cross-tag AI-07)*
Tech-Driven Taxes	ECON-05	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Limiting Partisan Influence	DEM-04	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Balanced Budgets	ECON-06	**drafted** *(fresh research)*
Immigration	GLOBAL-01	**drafted** *(fresh research; lawful pathways, adjudication capacity, worker protection, and due process)*
Elevating Transparency	PRIV-03	**drafted** *(fresh research; usable public accountability data, FOIA, spending, AI-use inventories, and bounded disclosure)*
Global Connectedness	GLOBAL-02	**drafted** *(fresh research; open networks, standards, digital public infrastructure safeguards, and partner capacity)*
Constitution, 1st Amendment	CONST-01	**drafted** *(fresh research; digital speech, platform editorial rights, and state pressure)*
Constitution, 2nd Amendment	CONST-02	**drafted** *(fresh research; modern arms, due process, traceability, and public safety)*
Constitution, 3rd Amendment	CONST-03	**drafted** *(fresh research; home autonomy and state use of private infrastructure)*
Constitution, 4th Amendment	CONST-04	**drafted** *(fresh research; digital warrants, data brokers, and surveillance)*
Constitution, 5th Amendment	CONST-05	**drafted** *(fresh research; digital due process, property, and compelled access)*
Constitution, 6th Amendment	CONST-06	**drafted** *(fresh research; digital criminal process, counsel, and confrontation)*
Constitution, 7th Amendment	CONST-07	**drafted** *(fresh research; civil juries, arbitration, and algorithmic harm)*
Constitution, 8th Amendment	CONST-08	**drafted** *(fresh research; bail, fines, sentencing, and digital punishment)*

2024 plank title	New domain/ID	Status
Constitution, 9th Amendment	CONST-09	**drafted** *(fresh research; unenumerated rights, medical privacy, and digital autonomy)*
Constitution, 10th Amendment	CONST-10	**drafted** *(fresh research; technology federalism, preemption, and state capacity)*
Constitution, other amendments	CONST-11	**drafted** *(fresh research; civil rights, state accountability, voting rights, prison labor, continuity, congressional pay, and Article V realism)*

Read of this table: two 2024 planks (Autonomous Vehicles, Automation) turned out to already be AI issues wearing a different name — that's the "lumped together" problem in miniature, just one level up. Seven planks were migrated faithfully into the new format first (six requested, plus Blockchain IDs added because Blockchain Voting names it as a load-bearing prerequisite), then substantively revised with independent 2025-2026 research rather than left as faithful ports — which is why all seven now carry `verification_status: ai-researched-unverified`, the same status the AI domain uses, not `source-migrated`. Thirty-three more (the full Technology Infrastructure domain, GOV-01/GOV-02, five of the six Economy & Innovation planks, Algorithmic Redistricting/Limiting Partisan Influence in Democracy & Elections, Space Exploration and Innovation, Revitalizing Rural America, Climate Challenge, Fusion Energy, the full Health & Bioscience domain, the full Global Affairs domain, Elevating Transparency, and the full Constitutional Modernization domain) were drafted fresh from current research from the start, never a port at any point, each still tracing to a real 2024 plank title even though none of that plank's actual text survived into the new file. Two issues have no 2024 origin at all: GOV-03 and GOV-04 were added because real 2025-2026 events exposed enforcement gaps this platform hadn't covered, not because a 2024 plank named them — see the Governance & Institutions section above for why. **Migrated** in this table describes an issue's starting point, not its current trust level — check each issue's own frontmatter, not this table, for that. This map has no pending rows now; future source gaps should be marked explicitly rather than silently dropped.