Commercial training access to copyrighted work should be compensated through a collective- licensing marketplace that pays individual creators as well as large rights-holders.
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Jul 4, 2026
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stance_type): the train-is-not-
plagiarism / gate-output-not-synthesis argument, and the collective-licensing-over-
compulsory-rate design choice, are the party's argued position, not empirical claims, and
reasonable rights-holder advocates and some AI developers would each disagree with it from
opposite directions, as addressed above.Three linked mechanisms, in dependency order: (1) a training-data transparency/disclosure duty (TRAIN Act model) as the foundational requirement, since no payment scheme is enforceable without it; (2) a federal collective-licensing clearinghouse for commercial frontier-model training on copyrighted creative works, opt-in per rights-holder, paying individual creators directly rather than only the aggregators who negotiate on their behalf; (3) a statutory safe harbor for smaller and open-source/nonprofit developers, calibrated by revenue or training-compute scale (consistent with the thresholds proposed in AI-02), so the clearinghouse cost structure doesn't become a barrier only the largest labs can clear. The infringement standard itself stays output-focused: substantially-similar or verbatim reproduction is the trigger, not the act of training.
Training is synthesis, not plagiarism, and doesn't require gatekeeping. But commercial training access should require compensation via collective licensing. Two distinct, narrow claims bundled together: one about what training is (not verbatim copying), one about what commercial use of copyrighted work owes its source, regardless of the first claim.
Primary — Inclusive Growth and Economic Development. "We back policies driving economic growth, job creation, and SME growth" directly supports treating creator compensation as a monetization opportunity. Individual artists and authors are exactly the kind of economic constituency this value is meant to serve, and today's licensing-deal structure routes around them entirely.
Secondary — Research, Innovation, and Collaboration. "We endorse open-source development and collaboration" and "we pursue investment in emerging technologies" are both served by a framework that keeps AI development moving rather than requiring blanket rights-holder consent for every training use. The clearinghouse model is chosen specifically because it avoids the alternative (strict consent-required licensing) that would slow development far more.
Acknowledged tension — the same Research, Innovation, and Collaboration value. A licensing-fee regime, even a well-designed one, raises the cost of training for anyone who isn't already well-capitalized, in tension with "we endorse open-source development," since open-source and nonprofit AI projects are exactly the actors least able to absorb a new licensing cost. This is not resolved by wishful thinking; it's why Proposal 5 (the safe harbor) exists as a load-bearing part of the position, not an afterthought.
The bipartisan TRAIN Act (Reps. Dean, D, and Moran, R, in the House; a bipartisan Senate companion) shows cross-party agreement on the transparency prerequisite this issue's clearinghouse proposal depends on. Both parties agree creators should be able to find out if their work was used to train a model, and the bill has drawn support from rights-holder organizations (RIAA) across the industry. Where the parties haven't converged is on the compensation mechanism: the U.S. Copyright Office's own review declined to endorse compulsory licensing, a position generally consistent with a market-based, rights-holder-consent-first approach that draws support from both large-rights-holder interests and creator-advocacy groups. This is less a partisan fight than an industry-vs-individual-creator one. The Innovation Party's delta: pair the bipartisan transparency mechanism (TRAIN Act) with a market-based collective-licensing clearinghouse — not compulsory licensing, consistent with the Copyright Office's own findings — specifically designed to route payment to individual creators rather than only the large rights-holders currently capturing AI licensing deals, a synthesis neither party's current bills fully achieve on their own.
The strongest good-faith objection: a collective-licensing clearinghouse, however well designed, still requires someone to decide how to value an individual creator's contribution to a model trained on an enormous corpus of works. And a critic could reasonably argue this is either practically unworkable at the scale required (already partly conceded elsewhere in this issue) or, if simplified enough to be administrable, will systematically underpay individual creators relative to what a fair per-work valuation would require. That's an argument for building the clearinghouse with per-creator payment floors and independent valuation audits from day one, not an argument against building it at all. The alternative already in place, where large rights-holders capture licensing deals and individual creators get nothing, is strictly worse than an imperfectly-calibrated clearinghouse that routes payment to people currently getting none.
AI companies bear new compensation costs, which could be passed through to consumers via pricing. Individual creators may still be underpaid relative to large rights-holders even under a clearinghouse model if its valuation formula favors scale or aggregation. Smaller and independent AI developers without major-label-scale licensing budgets could face a barrier to entry that better-resourced incumbents absorb more easily. Proposal 3's revenue- and compute-scaled safe harbor is built for exactly this: it exempts smaller and open-source developers from the clearinghouse cost structure entirely below the threshold, which is the deliberate design answer to this risk, not a residual one this position leaves unaddressed.
depends_on: [AI-10] rather
than restate this issue's position.stance_type): the train-is-not-
plagiarism / gate-output-not-synthesis argument, and the collective-licensing-over-
compulsory-rate design choice, are the party's argued position, not empirical claims, and
reasonable rights-holder advocates and some AI developers would each disagree with it from
opposite directions, as addressed above.Turn frustration into useful pressure.
If this position misses evidence or a lived consequence, challenge it. If it holds up, help test it locally and connect it to the issues around it.